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THE PLIGHT OF THE HANDICAPPED INFANT: THE 
FEDERAL RESPONSE 
William C. Mimst 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The starvation death in April, 1982, of a Bloomington, Indiana in-
fant afflicted with Down's syndrome,l esophageal atresia,2 and related 
medical conditions sparked a nationwide debate concerning the federal 
government's role in protecting handicapped infants. 3 The debate has 
been fueled by reports of other handicapped newborns dying after treat-
ment or nourishment was withheld4 and by simmering passions that ex-
tend beyond the facts of a particular "Infant Doe"5 case. The debate 
centers on three issues: 1) the tension between an infant's due process 
right to life and his parents' constitutional right of privacy to make medi-
t A.B., College of William & Mary, 1979; J.D., The National Law Center, George 
Washington University, 1984; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1986, 
candidate for M.A., College of William & Mary. The author is employed by the 
United States House of Representatives. 
1. Down's syndrome (or mongolism) is a chromosonal disorder producing mental re-
tardation. Down's syndrome is caused by the presence of 47 chromosomes, rather 
than the normal 46, in a person's cells. A person afHicted with Down's syndrome 
characteristically has a distinctively shaped head, neck, trunk, and abdomen. I J. 
SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER D-107 
(1985) [hereinafter cited as I J. SCHMIDT]; J. WARKANY, CONGENITAL MALFOR-
MATIONS 311-12, 316, 324, 327 (1971) [hereinafter cited as J. WARKANY]. 
2. Esophageal atresia is a congenital absence or blockage of the esophagus, which fre-
quently is correctable with surgery. I J. SCHMIDT, supra note I, at A-365; 2 J. 
SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER E-113 
(1985) [hereinafter cited as 2 J. SCHMIDT]; J. WARKANY, supra note I, at 678-83. 
3. In re Guardianship of Infant Doe, No. 1-782A 157 (Ind. Feb. 3, 1983) (appeal dis-
missed) (files sealed by order of the court). 
4. A 1983 article in the journal Pediatrics describes how five pediatricians at Oklahoma 
Children's Memorial Hospital selected 24 spina bifida patients for "non treatment" 
based upon a mathematical equation that factored the "economic and intellectual 
resources" of the infants' parents, the availability of medical resources, and the in-
fants' medical conditions. Gross, Early Management and Decision Making for the 
Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 72 PEDIATRICS 450 (1983); see also Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act Amendments of 1983: Hearings 
on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Family and Human Services of the Senate 
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1983) (state-
ments of Senators Denton and Nickles referring to a documentary on WNEV-TV in 
Boston that presented evidence of treatment being withheld from approximately 100 
infants) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; id. at 172-89 (additional case docu-
mentation); Mathematical Formula Decides Life and Death, The Washington 
Times, July 10, 1984, at lA, col. 1; HHS Beats Retreat on Newborn Rights, The 
Washington Times, July 12, 1984, at lA, col. 1 (reporting allegation that as many as 
65 handicapped infants may have died from nontreatment at Yale-New Haven Med-
ical School and affiliated hospitals). For reports on preventable deaths prior to 1981, 
see Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1975). 
5. "Infant Doe" refers to those infants whose names have been withheld from various 
publications, and handicapped infants generally who have not received treatment or 
nourishment. 
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cal treatment decisions for the child; 2) whether the quality of the in-
fant's life should be a factor in medical treatment decisions; and 3) the 
extent to which the government should become involved in the decision 
concerning choice of medical treatment. 
Prior to newspaper publication of the 1982 Infant Doe case,6 there 
was little federal activity specifically dealing with the decision to treat 
severely handicapped infants.7 Rather, treatment decisions were viewed 
as a private matter between physicians and parents. State child abuse 
and neglect doctrines8 and an American Medical Association (AMA) ad-
visory opinion provided the principal sources of guidance to physicians 
dealing with Infant Doe cases.9 The AMA opinion stated that the par-
ents' decision regarding treatment should be respected by the physician 
unless there is convincing evidence that the parents are not acting in the 
best interest of the infant. to This AMA guideline was criticized follow-
ing Infant Doe's death from starvation because it stipulated that the best 
interests of the child might be served by a decision not to "exert maximal 
efforts to sustain life." 
The Infant Doe debate in 1982 raised public concern as to whether 
the AMA position sufficiently protects the infant's interests and whether 
the federal government should have a role in treatment decisions. These 
issues have caused a split of opinion within the medical community. The 
majority of medical organizations do not oppose limited federal oversight 
of treatment decisions. I I The AMA, however, steadfastly opposes any 
6. See, e.g., Washington Post, Apr. 16, 1982 at A16, col.1. 
7. For example, in 1980, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) ap-
plied section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when a hospital with-
held surgery to correct an intestinal blockage from a Down's syndrome child. See 
48 Fed. Reg. 30,847-48 (1980). 
8. See Comment, Defective Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principles Em-
phasized by the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 569, 571-81 (1983). Every 
state has child protective services agencies that investigate child abuse and neglect 
reports. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340). 
9. AMA Judicial Council Op. 2.14 (1984) states that: 
Id. 
IO.Id. 
In desparate situations involving newborns, the advice and judgment of 
the physician should be readily available, but the decision whether to exert 
maximal efforts to sustain life should be the choice of the parents. The 
parents should be told the options, expected benefits, risks and limits of 
any proposed care; how the potential for human relationships is affected 
by the infant's condition; and relevant information and answers to their 
questions. The presumption is that the love which parents usually have 
for their children will be dominant in the decisions which they make in 
determining what is in the best interest of their children. It is to be ex-
pected that parents will act unselfishly, particularly where life itself is at 
stake. Unless there is convincing evidence to the contrary, parental au-
thority should be respected. 
11. Most major medical professional organizations supported the final version of the 
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. For a complete listing of organizations endors-
ing the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, see 130 CONGo REC. 58,952 (daily ed. 
July 20, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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degree of federal involvement in treatment decisions,12 In addition, the 
stance taken by the medical community that the decision of whether to 
treat a severely handicapped infant is essentially a private matter for phy-
sicians and the parents is opposed vehemently by a coalition of handi-
capped advocacy, civil rights, and pro-life organizations. The coalition 
contends that an infant's due process right to life is paramount to all 
other concerns and the coalition supports intervention by the federal gov-
ernment in instances where life-sustaining treatment is withheld. 
During the past four years, the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of the federal government have become involved in the develop-
ment of national policy pertaining to the rights of severely handicapped 
infants. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) at-
tempted to protect handicapped newborns under the authority of an ex-
isting civil rights statute, section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973,13 but this effort was rebuffed by the federal courtS.14 In 
addition, Congress has enacted the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984,15 
which authorize the withholding of certain federal monetary grants from 
states that do not promulgate and enforce procedures to protect handi-
capped infants. 
This article examines the issues involved in the current debate 
within the framework of a discussion and analysis of actions undertaken 
by HHS, Congress, and the federal jUdiciary. The article provides an 
overview of the HHS response under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 fol-
lowing the first widely publicized Infant Doe case and the judicial reac-
tion to HHS actions. The article also examines the development of the 
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and HHS regulations implementing 
the amendments. Finally, the article explores constitutional due process 
and privacy interests that may be affected by governmental action in In-
fant Doe cases. 
12. The AMA declined to endorse the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and was a 
party to American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 
sub nom. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), which invali-
dated 45 C.F.R. 84. 
13. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1982). The nondiscrimination language of section 504 provides: 
"No otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
.... " Id. 
14. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), aff'g American Hosp. 
Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. University 
Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d CiT. 1984); 
American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). 
15. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984); see 
infra notes 137-62 and accompanying text. 
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II. HHS RESPONSE UNDER SECTION 504 OF THE 
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 AND JUDICIAL 
REACTION 
A. The Initial HHS Response 
[Vol. 15 
Following the publication of newspaper articles about the death of 
the Bloomington, Indiana Infant Doe in April, 1982, handicapped and 
pro-life advocacy groups urged the Reagan Administration and Congress 
to enact preventative measures for the protection of handicapped infants. 
On April 30, 1982, President Reagan responded by directing HHS Secre-
tary Richard Schweiker and Attorney General William French Smith to 
apply section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 16 to prohibit hospi-
tals and other health service providers receiving federal assistance from 
denying handicapped individuals any benefit or service that ordinarily is 
provided to nonhandicapped individuals. 17 Section 504 broadly prohibits 
discrimination against handicapped individuals. Section 504 provides: 
"No otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by reason of his hand-
icap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving fed-
eral financial assistance." 18 
In response to the President's directive, HHS notified health care 
providers receiving federal financial assistance that existing section 504 
regulations 19 would be interpreted to prohibit the withholding of food 
and medical or surgical treatment necessary to correct a life-threatening 
condition if: (1) the nutrition or treatment would be withheld because the 
patient was afflicted with a handicap; and (2) the handicap would not 
render the nutrition or treatment medically contraindicated.20 Following 
dissemination of the HHS notice, the HHS Office of Civil Rights began 
to investigate complaints of discrimination against handicapped infants 
and to review the neonatal intensive care procedures of several major 
hospitals. 21 As part of the HHS investigation, investigators interviewed 
affected parties, contacted state and local agencies, and examined medi-
cal and legal documents.22 
In addition, on March 7, 1983, HHS published an Interim Final 
Rule23 pursuant to the rulemaking provision of section 504.24 The In-
terim Final Rule was designed to assist HHS in identifying handicapped 
16. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
17. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 11 (statement of Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon 
General of the United States). 
18. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
19. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.30), 84.52 (1985). 
20. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982). 
21. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 28 (statement of Betty Lou Dotson, Director 
of the Office of Civil Rights, HHS). 
22.Id. 
23. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983). 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 provides for rulemaking to implement the statute: "The head of 
each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry 
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infants who were being denied nutrition and medical care and to enhance 
HHS's access to the facilities and records of health care providers.25 The 
primary provisions of the Interim Final Rule set out the following meas-
ures: (1) the posting of prominent notices in each health care facility 
stating that the failure to feed and care for handicapped infants is prohib-
ited by federal law;26 (2) the establishment of a twenty-four hour a day 
telephone hotline that any individual could use to report incidents of se-
verely handicapped infants being denied food or medical treatment;27 
and (3) the issuance of a statement that access to records and facilities of 
health care providers would not be limited to normal business hours 
when immediate access is necessary to protect the life or health of a 
handicapped individual. 28 
B. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler 
Publication of the HHS Interim Final Rule was met by protests 
from medical groups decrying federal involvement in Infant Doe cases,29 
and the rule immediately was challenged in federal court. Within weeks, 
the rule was struck down by the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler.30 
The court determined that the HHS rule violated the rulemaking provi-
sions of the Administrative Procedure Act,31 because the rule was ap-
out the Amendments to this Section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive 
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978." 
25. See 48 Fed. Reg. 9630, 9631 (1983) for the full text of the notice. 
26.Id. 
27. Id. at 9631-32. 
28.Id. 
29. Four arguments have been advanced by critics of the HHS action and subsequent 
federal supervisory efforts. First, most of the protesting doctors argued that treat-
ment decisions are a private matter between physician and patient. See To Amend 
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Education and Labor 
Comm., lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1983) (statement of AMA) [hereinafter cited as 
House Hearings]. 
We oppose ... governmental interference into medical treatment decisions 
for handicapped infants .... We believe that unless there is convincing 
evidence that the parents are not acting in the interest of the child, the 
parents should decide what medical treatment their child will receive. We 
cannot support efforts that will result in the government second-guessing 
these parental decisions made in consultation with their physician. 
Id. But cj, 'Baby Doe': It's Not a 'Medical' Question, Washington Post, Apr. 17, 
1983 at D7, col. 1. Second, the regulation and supervision of medical and treatment 
decisions traditionally have resided at the state and local level under our federal 
system. Third, the HHS approach (utilizing a 24-hour "hotline" and investigative 
teams that initially might not be familiar with all aspects of the case) was overly 
intrusive. Fourth, treatment of severely handicapped infants diverted scarce re-
sources that could be used to treat infants who were more likely to survive and 
improve. See Lying Hopelessly Ill, Infant Tests New Law of Hospital Survival, 
Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1983 at A4, col. 3. 
30. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). 
31. 5 U.S.c. § 553 (1982). 
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proved without the requisite notice and public comment. 32 In addition, 
the court found that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because HHS 
failed to consider several substantive factors during the rulemaking pro-
cess. 33 Specifically, HHS did not consider the potentially disruptive ef-
fect of the hotline calls and investigations on the continuing treatment of 
infants.34 In addition, the court believed that HHS should have consid-
ered the advantages and disadvantages of relying on the wishes of parents 
in light of the forecasted quality of an infant's life.35 Finally, the court 
noted that HHS did not consider funding sources for the extensive care 
mandated by the regulation,36 nor did HHS review alternative means of 
protection, particularly those suggested by the President's Commission 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behaviorial Research.37 
C. The Second HHS Rule 
HHS redrafted the rule and incorporated substantive modifications 
sufficient to quell the protests that had surrounded the earlier effort. 38 
The new rule addressed the two major substantive problems identified by 
32. 561 F. Supp. at 398-401. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b),(d) 
(1982) requires general notice of proposed rulemaking at least thirty days before the 
effective date of the substantive Rules: 
(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Fed-
eral Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either person-
ally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. 
The notice shall include - (1) a statement of the time, place, and 
nature of public rulemaking proceedings; (2) reference to the legal 
authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or 
substance of the subjects and issues involved[.] 
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be 
made not less than 30 days before its effective date .... 
33. 561 F. Supp. at 399-400. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(A) 
(1982) requires the reviewing court to set aside agency action not in accordance 
with the law: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional 
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of 
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall -
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be - (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
34. 561 F. Supp. at 399. 
35. /d. at 400. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. The American Academy of Pediatrics court referred to REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter cited as FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT]. 
38. Within 90 days of Judge Gesell's order in American Academy of Pediatrics, HHS 
published a proposed rule. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983). Following extensive com-
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the district court in American Academy of Pediatrics. First, the rule at-
tempted to ameliorate the potentially disruptive effects of hotline calls by 
restricting the posting of hotline notices to locations where the notices 
are visible virtually exclusively to physicians and nurses. 39 Second, the 
rule also supported the principal recommendation of the President's 
Commission for an alternative means of protecting severely handicapped 
infants by providing for the creation of permanent Infant Care Review 
Committees (ICRCs) in each hospital.40 
HHS envisioned ICRCs serving several functions. The ICRCs were 
designed to act as a buffer between physicians and parents and the federal 
government. HHS intended to rely upon the ICRCs as an investigative 
organ whenever hotline complaints were registered, thereby reducing the 
number of on-site federal inspections.41 In addition, HHS contemplated 
that each hospital's ICRC would develop and implement policies and 
procedures regarding the administration of treatment to severely handi-
capped infants.42 Furthermore, in individual cases, ICRCs would func-
tion as a panel of experts reviewing treatment decisions.43 The suggested 
medically expert composition of the ICRCs served to quiet criticism that 
federal officials sought to interfere with the physician-patient 
relationship.44 
In addition to requiring the posting of informational notices and en-
couraging the establishment of ICRCs, the rule facilitated HHS access to 
hospital records, provided for expedited judicial action,45 and required 
ment, the final rule was published on January 12, 1984 with an effective date of 
February 13, 1984. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1984). 
39. 45 c.F.R. § 84.55(b)(2) (1984). The initial rule proposed by HHS required the post-
ing of a hotline notice in a conspicious location in each delivery ward, maternity 
ward, pediatric ward, and nursery of all hospitals receiving federal funds. 
40. 45 c.F.R. § 84.55(a) (1984); see FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra 
note 37, at 223-29. 
41. 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 App. C (b) (1984). 
42. Id. § 84.55(f)(3)(i) (1984). The HHS guidelines also list specific instances where 
withholding treatment from handicapped infants would not violate section 504. Id. 
at § 84.61 App. C. Treatment for anencephaly, spina bifida, and severe prematurity 
and low birth weight may be withheld if the decision is based on reasonable medical 
judgment that treatment would be futile or unlikely of success given complications, 
would create risks of potential harm to the infant, or merely would prolong the act 
of dying. Id. The listing of specific instances where treatment may be withheld 
clarified HHS's response to comments that treatment was not required if it would 
only postpone imminent or certain death. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 35-
36. Dr. Koop, the Surgeon General of the United States, commented that the HHS 
regulations were not intended to usurp a physician's perogative: 
Id. 
[Slome children are born dying and others face death a little bit further 
down the road. It is absolutely not this Department's intention to formu-
late any regulations which would interfere with a physician's understand-
ing of the difference between giving a patient a life to which he is entitled, 
as opposed to prolonging his act of dying. 
43. 45 C.P.R. § 84.55(f)(3)(ii) (1984). 
44. Id. § 84.55(f)(2) (1984). 
45. Id. § 84.55(d)-(e) (1984). 
456 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
state child protective services agencies to establish procedures under state 
law to protect handicapped infants.46 Moreover, the rule incorporated 
four interpretive guidelines to provide additional direction to health care 
providers.47 First, health care providers were prohibited from withhold-
ing treatment or nourishment that would medically benefit a handi-
capped infant.48 Second, treatment that would do no more than 
temporarily prolong the act of dying was not deemed medically benefi-
cia1.49 Third, in determining whether treatment would be medically ben-
eficial, reasonable medical decisions in selecting among alternative 
courses of treatment would be respected. 50 Fourth, when the parents of a 
severely handicapped infant refuse medically indicated treatment, the 
hospital must report the parents' refusal to the state child protective serv-
ices agency or must pursue judicial action to protect the infant.51 
The rule and the interpretive guidelines requiring the reporting of 
Infant Doe cases to state child protective services reflect a dilemma that 
HHS confronted when it first began its enforcement efforts. 52 Section 
504 contains provisions that expressly limit its application to recipients of 
federal financial assistance, a category that includes most hospitals. It is 
usually the parents, however, in consultation with a physician, who make 
the decision to withhold medical treatment from a handicapped infant. 53 
HHS recognized that section 504 could be used to prevent hospitals and 
their staff physicians from recommending the withholding of treatment, 
but more problematic was whether section 504 could be interpreted to 
preempt state common law doctrines that reserve for parents sole discre-
tion to approve treatment for their minor children. 54 HHS solved this 
dilemma by requiring hospital officials to notify state authorities when-
ever medical care or nourishment was withheld. 55 Thus, HHS applied 
section 504 directly to prevent hospitals from withholding treatment or 
advocating the withholding of treatment. In the event that parents de-
cided to withhold treatment, HHS interpreted section 504 as requiring 
the hospital and its staff to follow appropriate state procedures to protect 
the infant's interests. 
46. [d. § 84.55(c) (1984). 
47. [d. § 84.61 App. C (1984). 
48. [d. § 84.61 App. C(a)(I) (1984). 
49. [d. § 84.61 App. C(a)(2) (1984). 
50. [d. § 84.61 App. C(a)(3) (1984). 
51. [d. § 84.61 App. C(a)( 4) (1984). 
52. The emphasis in the rule and interpretive guidelines also reflects the HHS position 
that state enforcement action will be less controversial than federal enforcement 
action. "For those complaints that are expeditiously and effectively investigated 
and pursued by State agencies, the Secretary anticipates that additional federal ef-
forts often will be unnecessary." 48 Fed. Reg. 30,849 (1983). 
53. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 & 14,880 (1985) (to be codified at 45 c.F.R. 1340). 
54. For a discussion of the treatment accorded this issue by the Supreme Court in 
Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), see infra notes 126-27 and 
accompanying text. 
55. Notification to state authorities generally is required by state law. See 49 Fed. Reg. 
1630, 1631 (1984). 
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D. United States v. University Hospital, State University of New York 
at Stony Brook 
Within days after the new rule took effect, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United States v. University Hos-
pital, State University of New York at Stony Brook 56 that section 504 does 
not apply to medical treatment decisions. University Hospital arose when 
the parents of an infant with spina bifida,57 microcephaly, 58 and 
hydrocephalus, 59 declined surgery that could have prolonged the infant's 
life.60 The infant's parents, however, did not request physicians to end 
the provision of nutrition and antibiotics to the infant.6\ HHS requested 
access to the infant's medical records to determine whether the decision 
to forego surgery was based entirely on a handicapping condition and 
thus violative of section 504.62 
The hospital refused HHS's request for the records, and the Justice 
Department initiated judicial action to compel production.63 The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled for the 
hospital on summary judgment.64 The court found no evidence of dis-
crimination by the hospital because, in the absence of parental consent, 
the hospital lacked the legal right to perform surgery.65 
A divided three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling. Moreover, the 
court of appeals declared that there was no basis in section 504 for HHS 
56. 729 F.2d 144, 157-60 (2d Cir. 1984). The new rule became effective on February 
13, 1984. On February 23, 1984, the Second Circuit held section 504 inapplicable to 
Infant Doe situations. 
57. Spina bifida is a congenital defect in the development of the spine that leaves the 
vertebral canal exposed outside the body at some point and frequently results in 
partial or total paralysis of the lower extremities. Mental retardation also may oc-
cur if bacteria entering the exposed vertebral canal causes an infection in the central 
nervous system. The vertebral canal opening usually can be closed surgically, and 
the child's prognosis generally depends upon how quickly surgery is performed after 
birth. See 3 I. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD 
FINDER S-I40 (1985); I. WARKANY, supra note 1, at 272-75; see also Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 4, at 61-80 (statement of David G. McLone, MD, regarding the 
positive results of pursuing early surgery and aggressive treatment for spina bifida 
infants). 
58. Microcephaly is a congenital defect that causes an infant to have an abnormally 
small head and brain. Microcephaly usually results in severe mental retardation. 
See 2 I. SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at M-102; I. WARKANY, supra note 1, at 237-38. 
59. Hydrocephalus is a condition marked by an abnormal increase in the fluid that nor-
. mally is present in and around the brain. This condition usually results in mental 
retardation. See 2 I. SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at H-102; I. WARKANY, supra note 1, 
at 217-18. 
60. 729 F.2d at 146. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 147. 
63. Id. at 148. 
64. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 575 F. 
Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
65. Id. at 614. 
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actions to protect handicapped infants.66 Relying primarily on Southeast-
ern Community College v. Davis 67 and Doe v. New York University,68 the 
court reasoned that although the infant was a handicapped individual 
under section 504,69 the infant was not "otherwise qualified" under sec-
tion 504 and therefore was not protected from discrimination by the stat-
ute.70 The court stated that section 504 was intended to prohibit 
discrimination against handicapped individuals whose handicaps are un-
related to the medical services sought to be withheld.7) Consequently, 
according to the court, the phrase "otherwise qualified" cannot be ap-
plied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions 
without distorting its plain meaning. 72 
The University Hospital court also reasoned that even if a handi-
capped infant were otherwise qualified, the denial of treatment would not 
be discriminatory under section 504.73 According to the court, when the 
handicapping condition is related to the infirmity to be treated, rarely 
will it be possible to conclude with certainty that a particular treatment 
decision has been discriminatory.74 Lengthy litigation primarily involv-
ing conflicting expert testimony would be necessary to determine 
whether the decision to administer treatment is based on a bona fide 
medical judgment. 75 The court buttressed its holding by noting that the 
legislative history of section 504 indicated the section is applicable princi-
pally in a vocational context; Congress did not consider the application 
of section 504 to medical questions.76 
Judge Winter vigorously dissented from the majority opinion. He 
found that section 504 "states with as much clarity as is reasonably possi-
ble that in some circumstances recipients of federal financial assistance 
may not differentiate between individuals on grounds that one or more is 
handicapped."77 Judge Winter therefore concluded that the majority's 
consideration of legislative history was improper because courts should 
examine legislative history only when the statutory language is unclear.78 
Judge Winter also pointed out that section 504 is patterned after, 
and virtually identical to, section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,79 
66. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729 
F.2d 144, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1984). 
67. 442 U.S. 397 (1979); see infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. 
68.666 F.2d 761 (1981); see infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text. 
69. 729 F.2d at 155. 
70. Id. at 156. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. /d. at 157. 
74.Id. 
75. /d. 
76. Id. at 157-58. 
77. Id. at 161 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
78.Id. 
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000d (1964). That section states: "No per-
son in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
1986] Plight of the Handicapped Infant 459 
and thus should not be read more narrowly than section 601.80 A deci-
sion to refuse treatment to a person because of his race is not a bona fide 
medical judgment under section 601. 81 Section 504 entitles the govern-
ment to inquire whether a particular medical decision is bona fide: the 
same type of inquiry the government is entitled to make under section 
601.82 Judge Winter reasoned that the determination of what constitutes 
a bona fide medical judgment under section 504 of the Vocational Reha-
bilitation Act should parallel a like determination under section 601 of 
the Civil Rights Act. Accordingly, a decision not to correct a life-threat-
ening digestive problem because an infant has Down's syndrome is not a 
bona fide medical judgment.83 
E. Bowen v. American Hospital Association 
The University Hospital decision was relied upon by the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to declare 
the HHS rule invalid as outside the statutory authority granted the de-
partment by section 504. The decision, American Hospital Association v. 
Heckler,84 subsequently was affirmed by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to review the decision as Bowen v. American 
Hospital Association ,85 and on June 9, 1986, the Court upheld the Second 
Circuit decision by determining that the rulemaking was beyond the 
scope of HHS authority. 86 
The issues involved in University Hospital present difficult questions 
regarding legislative intent and statutory construction. Because Bowen v. 
American Hospital Association is based principally on procedural 
grounds, these issues merit further analysis. Specifically, a determination 
must be made as to whether in enacting section 504 Congress intended to 
create a statute broad enough to include situations that were not enunci-
ated specifically during debate over the bill and to include all federally-
assisted programs. In light of the University Hospital analysis, considera-
tion also must be given to whether the phrase "otherwise qualified," 
which limited the scope of the original 1973 Act to the employment and 
vocational rehabilitation contexts,87 limits the applicability of section 
504 in Infant Doe cases. 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." Id. 




84. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd sub 
nom. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). 
85. 105 S. Ct. 3975 (1985). 
86. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). 
87. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3739, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 6373, 6388, 6390. 
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In their attempts to discern the legislative intent underlying section 
504, lower courts have relied principally on the lack of a clear statement 
by Congress that section 504 applies to situations involving the medical 
treatment of handicapped infants.88 Prior to 1978, the year in which the 
Rehabilitation Act was last amended, congressional attention was not fo-
cused on Infant Doe cases. It is recognized as a matter of statutory con-
struction, however, that every conceivable application of a statute need 
not be considered in order to give the statute its intended effect.89 A 
proper analysis of section 504 therefore requires an examination as to 
whether Congress intended that section 504 apply to situations in the 
broad medical context. 
1. Legislative Intent: Section 504 as a Civil Rights Statute 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to implement compre-
hensive changes in federally-assisted state vocational rehabilitation pro-
grams that existed under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act.9o The goals 
of the 1973 Act were to encourage employment of the handicapped and 
to enhance generally the ability of handicapped persons to function in 
society.91 The 1973 Act was a negotiated agreement between Congress 
and the Nixon Administration, because President Nixon had vetoed two 
previous bills.92 Congressional proponents urged modification of the 
1973 Act to implement Congress's desire to prohibit discrimination in all 
situations, not just in employment situations. 
In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the 1973 Act that substan-
tially expanded the scope of the Act.93 In 1973, section 504 of the 1973 
88. See University Hasp., 729 F.2d 144, 159-60; American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C. 1983). 
89. This principle was first expressed by Justice Holmes, in a decision written when he 
was a circuit judge: 
A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in the policy 
of the law, although it expresses that change only in the specific cases most 
likely to occur to the mind. The Legislature has the power to decide what 
the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however 
indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise 
of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces 
the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate dis-
charge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you 
have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before. 
Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (emphasis added). 
90. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6373, 6376. 
91. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2076,2077. 
92. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2076, 2077-78. 
93. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 6373, 6376-77; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 
624, 632 (1984) (acknowledging that a year after enactment of the statute Congress 
amended it, clarifying Congress's intent to prohibit other types of discrimination 
besides employment discrimination of handicapped individuals). 
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Act only applied to handicapped individuals in the context of employ-
ment or vocational rehabilitation. The 1974 Amendments expanded the 
reach of section 504 to include all handicapped individuals, regardless of 
their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation services 
with respect to federally aided programs.94 As amended, section 504 in-
cludes statutory language patterned after the antidiscrimination language 
of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relating to race, color, or 
national origin95 and section 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972 
relating to sex.96 Section 504 reflects Congress's desire to establish a 
broad governmental policy that all programs receiving federal financial 
assistance be operated without discrimination on the basis of handicap. 97 
By intentionally patterning section 504 after section 601 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and section 901 of the Education Amendments of 
1972, Congress demonstrated its desire that section 504 be interpreted as 
expansively as other federal civil rights statutes.98 The remarks of Repre-
sentative Emmanuel Cellar, principal House sponsor of section 601 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, are instructive on the reach of federal civil 
rights law in the medical context: "The bill would offer assurance that 
hospitals financed by Federal money would not deny adequate care to 
Negroes .... It would, in short, assure the existing right to equal treat-
ment in the enjoyment of Federal funds."99 Nothing in the legislative 
history of the 1974 amendments to section 504 indicates that section 504 
should be given a narrower scope in the medical context than section 
601. 
2. The Reach of the "Otherwise Qualified" Limitation 
Relying principally on the Supreme Court's decisions in Southeast-
ern Community College v. Davis 100 and its own decision in Doe v. New 
94. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6373, 6373-74. 
95. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS at 6390. 
96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The significance of the analogy to section 
601 was expressed by Judge Winter in his University Hospital dissent when he 
pointed out that the decision not to perform surgery because a person is black is 
equivalent to the decision not to perform surgery because a person is handicapped. 
Judge Winter concluded that neither decision was a bonafide medical judgment and 
that both decisions were proscribed by federal law. See supra text accompanying 
notes 79-83; United States V. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony 
Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting). 
97. Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.c. § 1681(a) (1982). That section pro-
vides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... " Id. 
98. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6373, 6390. 
99. See id. 
100. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). 
462 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
York University,101 both of which involved denial to handicapped persons 
of admission to educational programs, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in United States v. University Hospital, State 
University of New York at Stony Brook interpreted the phrase "otherwise 
qualified" to mean that section 504 only applied to "static" programs or 
activities, such as education, employment, and transportation, and not to 
the "comparatively fluid" context of medical treatment decisions. 102 To 
hold otherwise, the majority concluded, would distort the statute's plain 
meaning. 103 
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a college could deny a hear-
ing-impaired applicant admission to its nursing program because the ap-
plicant would be unable to graduate unless substantial modifications 
were made in the instructional program. 104 In finding that the appli-
cant's handicap prevented her from being otherwise qualified, the Court 
defined an otherwise qualified individual as one who is able to meet all of 
the requirements of a particular program notwithstanding the presence 
of a handicap.105 The Court also stated that section 504 does not compel 
educational institutions to disregard disabilities of handicapped persons 
or to make substantial modifications in instructional programs; rather, 
section 504 directs that the "mere possession of a handicap is not a per-
missible ground for assuming an inability to function in a particular con-
text."106 In this regard, the Court agreed with HHS that under section 
504 an individual who meets all of the requirements for participation in a 
federally-assisted program, but lacks a legitimate physical qualification, 
such as "a blind person possessing all of the qualifications for driving a 
bus except sight," is not protected by section 504.107 
Doe v. New York University 108 arose when a former medical student, 
who had concealed from New York University admissions officials a his-
tory of stress-related psychiatric problems, was denied readmission to the 
University's medical school because school officials feared a recurrence of 
erratic behavior.109 The Second Circuit, relying upon Davis, upheld the 
University's decision denying readmission. The court held that the 
phrase "otherwise qualified" permitted consideration of the student's 
psychiatric handicap provided it was relevant to reasonable qualifications 
for acceptance. 1 10 
In deciding University Hospital, the Second Circuit's reliance upon 
101. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981). 
102. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729 
F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984); see supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
103. 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984). 
104. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400-02, 414 (1979). 
105. /d. at 406. 
106. [d. at 405. 
107. [d. at 407. 
108. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981). 
109. [d. at 765-71. 
110. [d. at 775. 
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Davis was misplaced. In Davis, the Supreme Court's analysis was limited 
to the vocational and educational contexts presented by the facts of the 
case, contexts which involve specific minimum standards for participa-
tion. There is no indication that the Court intended its holding to apply 
with equal weight to other contexts, such as transportation, housing, and 
health care, where no minimum standards or qualifications bar participa-
tion. Davis deals only with the vocational and educational contexts; ac-
cordingly, its definition of "otherwise qualified" should be limited to 
situations involving merit based standards or minimum qualifications 
that generally bar entry to individuals, handicapped or otherwise, who 
do not fulfill the threshold requirements. 
The novel distinction drawn by the University Hospital court be-
tween "static" programs and the "comparatively fluid" context of medi-
cal treatment decisions is untenable. The distinction does not provide a 
principled basis for determining the relevance of the phrase "otherwise 
qualified." Neither the statute nor its legislative history contains lan-
guage that draws a distinction between static and fluid programs. In-
stead, the distinction conflicts with the expansive reach that Congress 
intended to give the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, because health services 
are expressly included within the scope of the Act. Moreover, other ex-
isting civil rights laws have been held to encompass medical situations. III 
A better distinction would be based on the criteria of exclusive ver-
sus nonexclusive programs. This distinction is more useful than that 
drawn by the University Hospital court because it does not distort the 
plain meaning of the phrase "otherwise qualified." More importantly, 
this distinction effectuates the stated congressional intent for a broad 
government policy precluding discrimination against handicapped indi-
viduals. 112 The critical distinction between the myriad of categories in 
section 504 is that some are exclusive in nature, such as those related to 
employment and education, whereas others like transportation, housing, 
and health services are nonexclusive in nature. Exclusive programs have 
eligibility requirements for participation that are independent of handi-
cap, such as prior qualifications, work experience, and predicted or 
demonstrated ability to perform the desired tasks. Nonexclusive pro-
grams are services that are provided on a broad scale by the federal gov-
ernment for which eligibility is dependent upon need and the availability 
of the resource and, in some instances, the ability of the handicapped 
individual to pay for the resource. Nonexclusive programs were the prin-
cipal focus of the 1974 amendments, and the preexisting "otherwise qual-
Ill. See, e.g., Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212,230 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 627 F.2d 620 (2d 
Cir. 1980) ("Health care programs were clearly among those to which ... [section 
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] was intended to apply"); National Ass'n for 
Advancement of Colored People v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 
330 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Marable v. Alabama 
Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (D. Ala. 1969) (same). 
112. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6373, 6390. 
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ified" limitation has no meaning when applied to nonexclusive programs. 
For example, a handicapped person need not be otherwise qualified to 
ride a public transit bus or to benefit from medical services. 
The distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive programs is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's definition in Davis that "[a]n other-
wise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's re-
quirements in spite of his handicap." I 13 The distinction recognizes that 
there are federally-assisted programs in which there are no requirements 
barring participation other than need and availability of the resource. 
The federal role in these programs is to guarantee access because of the 
handicap rather than in spite of the handicap. In the context of exclusive 
programs, such as the nursing program examined in Davis, there are 
clear and objective requirements to be "otherwise qualified." If an indi-
vidual seeking an educational or vocational opportunity has met the min-
imum eligibility requirements based upon merit, prior experience, 
predicted or demonstrated ability to succeed, or other established crite-
ria, then the presence of a handicapping condition will not bar the indi-
vidual from consideration. Likewise, according to Davis, if an individual 
has not achieved these minimum standards for eligibility, the presence of 
a handicapping condition does not require substantial special 
consideration. 
Application of the section 504 protections to nonexclusive programs 
is consistent with the Davis formulation. In the context of nonexclusive 
programs, an otherwise qualified handicapped individual is one who is 
able to meet all of the requirements, if any, for participation in any feder-
ally-assisted program in spite of his handicap and who is excluded from 
participation, denied benefits, or subjected to discrimination under any 
such activity.114 Accordingly, a handicapped infant who seeks medical 
treatment must be considered "otherwise qualified" if the treatment 
would be beneficial, the hospital offers the treatment required by the in-
fant, and other requirements, such as ability to pay, are met. 
The flaw of the University Hospital court's distinction between static 
programs and the fluid context of medical treatment is evident when the 
University Hospital and Davis analyses are applied to the facts of a recent 
Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Baylor University Medical Center. I IS 
In Baylor, a Texas hospital prevented HHS from examining records and 
interviewing personnel as part of an HHS inquiry to determine whether 
the hospital had discriminated against a deaf patient by refusing to allow 
her interpreter into the hospital to assist her in understanding preopera-
tive and postoperative discussions with the medical staff. I 16 The court 
held that the hospital's receipt of Medicare and Medicaid payments con-
stituted federal financial assistance and thus section 504 was applicable to 
113. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406. 
114. See supra note 13. 
115. 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 958 (1985). 
116. !d. at 1041. 
1986] Plight of the Handicapped Infant 465 
protect the disabled individua1. 1I7 Under Baylor, a disabled individual 
would be protected by section 504 whenever a hospital receives federal 
funds. Under the reasoning of University Hospital, however, the Texas 
hospital would not have violated section 504 merely by refusing to treat 
any condition of the deaf patient related to her handicapping condition. 
In contrast to the Baylor court, which guaranteed the deaf patient full 
and meaningful access to health services as required by section 504,118 
the University Hospital court bars the application of section 504 to any 
medical treatment decisions after access is secured. The right of access 
to medical treatment is of little consequence and the protective capability 
of section 504 is without effect if, once a deaf person or handicapped 
infant comes through the hospital door, he can be denied treatment 
merely because section 504 does not apply to medical treatment deci-
sions. Applying the Davis analysis to the facts of Baylor, the deaf patient 
would be otherwise qualified, and therefore able to bring her interpreter 
into the hospital, because this activity does not require a substantial mod-
ification or disruption of the hospital's policies and procedures. Further-
more, section 504 would require treatment of her handicapping condition 
if the necessary treatment normally were available at the hospital and if 
she met hospital requirements for treatment, which could include an abil-
ity to benefit from and pay for the treatment. 
3. The Supreme Court's ruling in Bowen v. American 
Hospital Association 
Rather than ruling on the principal issue in University Hospital -
the meaning of the term "otherwise qualified" and whether that term 
bars application of section 504 to medical treatment decisions - the 
Supreme Court in Bowen v. American Hospital Association 119 held on a 
narrow procedural issue, finding that there was not a proper evidentiary 
basis for the HHS rulemaking. 120 The Court struck down the HHS regu-
lations and declined to examine the scope of section 504 in treatment 
decisions involving handicapped infants. 
The plurality opinion 121 stated that there was no statutory discrimi-
nation because the administrative record compiled by HHS consisted ex-
117. Id. at 1050. 
118. The University Hospital panel would agree with the Baylor court regarding access to 
the hospital. See United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at 
Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). The University Hospital court stated that 
section 504 was passed in order to "[guarantee] handicapped individuals access to 
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance." [d. at 159. In the view 
of the University Hospital court, access to appropriate medical treatment is not re-
quired by section 504. 
119. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). 
120. Id. at 2121. The Court found that "the administrative record does not contain the 
reasoning and evidence that is necessary to sustain federal intervention into a histor-
ically state-administered decisional process." Id. at 2122. 
121. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by only Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Pow-
ell. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Justice White wrote a dissent-
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clusively of cases in which parents, not a hospital or its physicians, made 
the decision to withhold treatment. 122 Section 504 did not purport to 
regulate parental decisions regarding treatment. Only hospitals and their 
agents were subject to regulation by section 504. Hence, the plurality 
concluded that in the cases included in the administrative record, there 
was no discrimination as defined in section 504. In circumstances where 
treatment was withheld, absent a parental request to furnish treatment, a 
handicapped infant could not be deemed "otherwise qualified" or the vic-
tim of discrimination "solely by reason of his handicap."123 
Such a literalistic view of the decision-making process, that is either 
the physician or the parent decides, oversimplifies what is often a com-
plex situation. Distraught parents may turn to their pediatrician, neona-
tal specialists, clergy, counselors, or friends for guidance. In situations 
where physicians strongly would urge the parents to choose non treat-
ment, the plurality would find no violation of section 504, because it may 
not "prevent the giving of advice to do something which section 504 does 
not itself prohibit" [i.e., the parental decision not to treat]. This troub-
ling interpretation presumes that no matter how strongly a physician 
urges cessation of treatment, section 504 is inapplicable so long as the 
distraught parent acquiesces in the nontreatment decision. Such a nar-
row view of section 504 ignores the broad remedial purpose of the Act 
and congressional intent to enact an aggressive federal policy to protect 
the civil rights of the handicapped. 124 Moreover, by stripping HHS of its 
regulatory procedure to investigate alleged discrimination, the Court 
handcuffs HHS on those occasions where certain potentially lifesaving 
measures may not have been presented to the parents for their 
consideration. 
HHS had anticipated that a non treatment decision made by the par-
ent would not violate section 504.125 In such cases, HHS anticipated 
that the state child protective services agencies would proceed under 
state statute or the parens patriae doctrine; the regulations therefore re-
quired the hospital to notify the agency of any such nontreatment. The 
Supreme Court also struck down this provision, however, finding that 
although the Secretary "can require state agencies to document their own 
compliance with section 504, nothing in that provision authorizes him to 
commandeer state agencies to enforce compliance by other recipients of 
federal funds .... "126 The Court provided a restrictive interpretation of 
this provision by finding that it was an attempt to do indirectly that 
ing opinion that was joined by Justices Brennan and O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist 
did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. 
122. See id. at 2115 & n.18. 
123. Id. at 2114. 
124. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
125. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures & Guidelines Relating 
to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1621, 1627 (1984) (codified at 
45 C.F.R. § 84.55). 
126. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. at 2120. 
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which might not be done directly. A more precise analysis for the regu-
lation must be premised on an inquiry as to whether section 504 is broad 
enough to require federally-assisted programs127 to take all legal steps 
under existing state law to protect handicapped infants. State agencies 
are not being "commandeered" to enforce compliance with the federal 
statute; rather, as beneficiaries of federally-assisted programs, these agen-
cies merely are being directed to enforce state doctrines. Far from being 
a "federal intervention into a historically state-administered decisional 
process," this provision evidences a respect for the necessary balance be-
tween the traditional dominant role of the states in medical treatment 
issues and the emergent and widely-accepted federal role in protecting 
the civil rights of the handicapped. 
Justice White's dissent128 rests on twin foundations. First, he 
strongly disagrees with the University Hospital analysis and would re-
mand to the court of appeals on that basis. Second, he disagreed with the 
plurality's view that consent is granted or withheld solely by the parent: 
"In fact, the doctors (directly) and the hospital (indirectly) in most cases 
participate in the formulation of the final parental decision and in many 
cases substantially influence that decision. Consequently, discrimination 
against a handicapped infant may assume guises other than the outright 
refusal to treat once parental consent has been given."129 
Regarding the reliance of the lower courts on University Hospital, 
the dissent found that section 504 may apply to medical treatment deci-
sions and that the "otherwise qualified" limiting language in the statute 
does not justify "the wholesale conclusion"130 that section 504 cannot 
apply to handicapped infants. "That some or most failures may not fall 
within section 504, that discerning which failures to treat as discrimina-
tory may be difficult, and that applying section 504 in this area may in-
trude into the traditional functions of the state do not support the 
categorical conclusion that the section may never be applied to medical 
decisions about handicapped infants."I31 
After dismissing the University Hospital analysis, Justice White 
would remand the case to the court of appeals to determine the scope of 
the statutory authority and to determine whether the regulations are 
within that authority. He also disagreed with the Court's apparent pre-
sumption that the consent process involves a simple yes or no from the 
parent: 
Discrimination may occur when a doctor encourages or fails to 
discourage a parental decision to refuse consent to treatment 
for a handicapped child when the doctor would discourage or 
127. State child protective services agencies receive funding under the Child Abuse Pre-
vention & Treatment Act of 1974, among other sources. 
128. Bowen v. American Hasp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. at 2123. 
129. [d. at 2129 (White, J., dissenting). 
130. !d. at 2127 (White, J., dissenting). 
131. [d. 
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actually oppose a parental decision to refuse consent to the 
same treatment for a non handicapped child. Or discrimination 
may occur when a doctor makes a discriminatory treatment 
recommendation that the parents simply follow. Alternatively, 
discrimination may result from a hospital's explicit laissez-faire 
attitude about this type of discrimination on the part of 
doctors. 132 
If the scenarios presented in the dissent exist, section 504 would indeed 
apply and discrimination may occur. The plurality, by presuming that 
the parents control the decision-making process, fails to confront the 
problem. 
In support of his position that doctors do playa substantial role in 
the decision-making process, Justice White cited a published survey of 
pediatricians and pediatric surgeons that indicates that 23.6 percent of 
pediatric surgeons and 13.2 percent of pediatricians would encourage 
parents to refuse consent to surgery when faced with the medical 
problems in the Bloomington Baby Doe case (Down's syndrome with 
intestinal atresia).133 By comparison, only 7.9 percent of pediatric sur-
geons and 2.6 percent of pediatricians would acquiesce in parental refusal 
to treat intestinal atresia in an infant with no other affliction. 134 If this 
survey data is substantially accurate and if distraught parents do indeed 
give weight to their doctor's advice-both reasonable assumptions-then 
discrimination does occur and section 504 should apply. 
The dissent also would uphold the requirement that state child pro-
tective services agencies act to protect handicapped infants. The dissent 
believes that "the regulations simply track the existing state procedures 
found to exist by the Secretary .... "135 
Although the Supreme Court's narrow holding in Bowen v. Ameri-
can Hospital Association struck down the HHS rules on the basis of a 
faulty administrative record, the extent to which it may otherwise allow 
HHS to use section 504 on a case-by-case basis to protect handicapped 
infants was left for another day. Citing Alexander v. Choate,136 the Court 
did find that a hospital rule or state policy that denied "meaningful ac-
cess" to handicapped infants would be subject to challenge under section 
504; however, the Court did not explore the meaning of "meaningful ac-
cess" in this context. The Court thus declined to rule on the potential 
protective scope of section 504 when individual medical treatment deci-
sions are involved. 
132. Id. at 2129 (White, J., dissenting). 
133. Id.; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care 
for Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,845, 30,848 (1983) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. § 84.55) (proposed July 5, 1983) (citing Shaw, Randolph & Manuel, Ethical 
Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians & Pediatric Surgeons, 
60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977». 
134. Id. at 2131 (White, J., dissenting). 
135.Id. 
136. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
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By enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and particularly section 
504, Congress sought to create a broad civil rights statute to eliminate 
discrimination against the handicapped in all federally-assisted pro-
grams, including health services. A future Court has been left with the 
task of deciding the extent to which section 504 projects into the realm of 
individual treatment decisions. 
III. THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984: THE 
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
The storm of controversy that engulfed the interpretation of the sec-
tion 504 regulations created pressure on Congress to enact further legis-
lation protecting handicapped infants. The continued criticism of early 
federal investigatory and enforcement actions, however, spelled trouble 
for any solution that broadened the federal role within the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.137 Consequently, advocates for handicapped 
infants proposed that Congress amend the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act of 1974138 (hereinafter the "1974 Act") to require that 
states, as a condition of receiving federal monies for child abuse pro-
grams, establish programs and procedures within their child protective 
services systems designed to prevent the withholding of medical treat-
ment from handicapped infants. Legislation amending the 1974 Act was 
intended to supplement, rather than to supplant, federal activity under 
section 504.139 
As introduced in 1984, the House bill to amend the 1974 Act con-
tained three major amendments relating to the treatment of handicapped 
infants. First, each state would be required to develop procedures to en-
sure that nutrition, medical treatment, general care, and appropriate so-
cial services were being provided to infants with life-threatening 
congenital impairments. l40 The federal government was to assist the 
states in developing procedures. 141 Second, each state would be required 
to establish procedures that would enable any individual to report the 
denial of treatment to or care for a handicapped infant. 142 Third, the 
failure to satisfy either the first or second requirement would result in the 
loss of federal grant monies under the 1974 Act. 143 
137. For Congressional proponents of the rights of handicapped infants to press for 
amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, while HHS contemporaneously was litigat-
ing the applicability of the Act to Infant Doe situations, would have been tanta-
mount to admitting that section 504 did not apply to Infant Doe cases. 
138. 42 U.S.c. §§ 5101-5106 (1974). 
139. Both the Senate and House bills were amended in committee to state: "No provision 
in this Act may be so construed as to limit or lessen any right or protection under 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 
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A. The meaning of "medically indicated treatment" 
The original text of the House bill, although requiring that medi-
cally indicated treatment be provided to handicapped infants, neglected 
to define this phrase. The omission of a definition led to charges during 
the House floor debate that medically indicated treatment could be inter-
preted to require intrusive governmental inquiries when death was immi-
nent and irreversible. 144 Representative Chandler, a leading opponent of 
the legislation, observed that "medically indicated treatment" is a broad 
phrase and expressed his concern that, without Congressional definition, 
courts would continue to disagree about its application. 145 In addition, 
Representative Chandler stated his concern that "one person's medically 
indicated treatment is another person's futile gesture .... "146 The criti-
cism that the legislation to amend the 1974 Act would require physicians 
and other members of a hospital staff to undertake heroic actions to post-
pone imminent death recurred throughout the House debate. 147 
144. 130 CONGo REC. H390 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Thomas) ("The 
transfer of decisionmaking regarding medical treatment of the infant from the medi-
cal team to federal bureaucrats must not be allowed."); 130 CONGo REC. H398 
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Ferraro) ("Are we really going to add to 
the grief and torment of a young couple, whose hopes and prayers for a healthy 
baby have been shattered, the burden of complying with that ill-advised intrusion of 
federal law?"); 130 CONGo REC. H398-400 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of 
Rep. Miller): 
I only wish every member could listen to the doctors describing the par-
ents coming back to the hospital in the middle of the night, sitting at the 
side of the child that is in the intensive care unit ... and making a decision 
whether it is going to be conservative medical treatment, ordinary medical 
treatment or heroic efforts. . .. [B]ecause someone determines they are an 
interested party they will sue under this statute ... or a district attorney 
with political ambitions will determine he is an interested party and now 
that family is on display. 
145. 130 CONGo REC. H384 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Chandler). 
146. Id. 
147. 130 CONGo REC. H384 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Chandler): 
It would appear that the goal of some who advocate State control of deci-
sions concerning at-risk infants take the view that, regardless of conse-
quences, the lives of all infants should be maintained if it is technically 
feasible to do so. This raises the moral question of whether it is more 
correct to keep a seriously ill child in suffering or to allow nature to take 
its merciful course. In many cases the issue is not whether the child will 
die, but when. 
130 CONGo REC. H389 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984 (statement of Rep. Hall) ("[C]hild 
abuse includes cases where extraordinary life support measures are terminated for 
terminally handicapped infants. Surely, the parents of an infant with terminal con-
genital impairments who have agonized over the painful decision to stop the pro-
longed agony of their child are not child abusers."); 130 CONGo REC. H390 (daily 
ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Thomas) ("[I]t must be recognized that despite 
... the increasing advances in medical technology not all infants can be saved. 
Extraordinary life saving measures in these instances result in inappropriate and 
often painful treatment unnecessarily prolonging the dying process."); 130 CONGo 
REC. H396 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) ("Physicians and 
parents ... will be forced to prolong even those severe cases that everyone would 
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Although proponents of the 1984 bill repeatedly stated that their 
intent was not to intervene when death was imminent, the controversy 
continued. After an amendment to the measure, proposed by Representa-
tive Chandler, that would have provided guidelines for hospitals to create 
local review committees, rather than force states to adopt and enforce 
regulations to protect handicapped infants, was defeated by a vote of 182 
to 231,148 the original measure was passed by the House by a vote of 396 
to 4 and sent to the Senate. 149 The controversy caused the bill to be 
sidetracked in the Senate for more than a year. ISO A compromise defini-
tion of medically indicated treatment ultimately was agreed to by the 
Senate and ensured that heroic measures were not required to prolong 
agree are only hopeless pain.");130 CONGo REC. H397 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) 
(statement of Rep. Quillen): 
The newborn, if he or she is suffering to the point of death and they have 
to call the regional office or call Washington, D.C., and say, "Get a man 
on a plane down here to this hospital and tell us what we should do," and 
in the meantime this infant, this severely handicapped individual, could 
die before the bureaucrats can act. Is this the next step? I think it is a 
mistake that we should have legislation to direct us in that vein. 
130 CONGo REC. H398 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rowland): 
Many doctors now feel in jeopardy with people who are severely handi-
capped, possibly because of brain death and are being kept alive on ex-
traordinary life support systems, they are fearful of what might take place 
and being brought into court. I see exactly the same thing happening 
under this particular situation. 
130 CONGo REC. H400 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Miller): 
These families ... [which believed] that the best of all worlds was going to 
be visited upon them in a healthy, normal, wonderful bouncy child, and 
then to find out that no skull existed, to find out that the intestines were 
outside the body, to find out that the child ... is going to die within a year 
. . . and then to find out that somebody . . . hauls you off to court to 
second-guess every medical decision you made. 
148. 130 CONGo REc. H401 (dailyed. Feb. 2, 1984). The amendment proposed by Rep-
resentative Chandler setting forth guidelines for hospitals to create local review 
committees provided: 
Sec. 108(a). The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall by 
regulations establish guidelines for advisory committees to provide advice 
to hospitals that provide care for seriously ill newborns and to the physi-
cians and families using the hospitals respecting the care and treatment of 
seriously ill newborns and to -
(1) provide advice when the decisions are being considered to with-
hold or withdraw from such newborns life sustaining medical or surgical 
treatment; and 
(2) recommend institutional policies concerning the withholding or 
withdrawal of medical or surgical treatment to such newborns. 
The guidelines shall provide that such advisory committees should 
include representatives of the medical, nursing, and other health care pro-
fessions, providers of social services, hospitals, organizations which repre-
sent the disabled, and persons with training in ethics or theology. 
149. 130 CONGo REC. H423 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984). 
150. The Senate bill was approved by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Commit-
tee in May 1983, but was not brought up on the Senate floor until July 1984. The 
bill passed on July 26, 1984, by a vote of 89-0. 
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the lives of terminally ill infants.151 As a result, the Senate bill incorpo-
rating specifically enunciated limited exceptions to the phrase "medically 
indicated" treatment was approved without dissent. 152 The Conference 
Report, which essentially adopted the Senate version, was approved by 
the House on September 26, 1984,153 and by the Senate on September 28, 
1984. 154 
The definition of medically indicated treatment contained in the en-
actment provides for three circumstances where treatment, other than 
nutrition, hydration, and medication, is not considered medically indi-
cated.155 First, treatment is not medically indicated where the infant is 
chronically and irreversibly comatose.156 Second, when treatment 
merely would prolong dying and would not be effective in ameliorating 
or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or would be 
otherwise futile in terms of the infant's survival, then such treatment is 
not deemed medically indicated. 157 Third, treatment that would be vir-
tually futile in terms of the infant's survival and that under the circum-
stances would be inhumane is not medically indicated. 158 
B. When treatment will be "futile" or "virtually futile and inhumane" 
Because the definition of medically indicated treatment was devel-
oped following the completion of congressional hearings, committee re-
ports, and action by the House of Representatives, there is little 
legislative history concerning the phrase. The available legislative his-
tory establishes the existence of a substantial consensus that treatment 
151. 130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984). 
152. 130 CONGo REC. S9328 (daily ed. July 26, 1984). 
153. 130 CONGo REC. HIO,327-39 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984). 
154. 130 CONGo REC. S12,382-92 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1984). 
155. Even the bill's critics deplored the starvation of infants, such as Infant Doe, in 
Bloomington, Indiana. "That was an outrageous situation repugnant to every 
Member of this House." 130 CONGo REC. H400 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement 
of Rep. Miller). 
156. The complete definition of medically indicated treatment follows: 
[T]he term "withholding of medically indicated treatment" means the fail-
ure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing 
treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) 
which, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judg-
ment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all 
such conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to pro-
vide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medica-
tion) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or physicians' 
reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly 
comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong 
dying, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's 
life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the sur-
vival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtu-
ally futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself 
under such circumstances would be inhumane. 
42 U.S.c. § 5102 (1984). 
157. /d. 
158. Jd. 
1986] Plight of the Handicapped Infant 473 
that would merely prolong dying, treatment that would not ameliorate or 
correct all life-threatening conditions, and treatment of a chronically and 
irreversibly comatose infant should not be required. 159 The legislative 
history, however, is silent as to the definition of the terms "futile," "vir-
tually futile," and "inhumane." The legislative silence is complicated 
further by the clear intention of the sponsors and supporters of the 1974 
Act that "quality of life" not be considered in treatment decisions. 160 As 
a result, there is the potential for varying interpretations of the amend-
ment as hospitals and physicians attempt to determine when medically 
indicated treatment actually is required. 
The only time that the issue of futile, virtually futile, and inhumane 
treatment was explained during the congressional debate occurred when 
Senator Nickles, one of the Act's principal sponsors, stated that Congress 
was attempting to address gray areas. 161 Senator Nickles noted: 
These are the cases when the child has a very slim chance for 
survival and the physician must make a judgment call as to 
whether the odds of correcting the child's condition are strong 
enough to merit an attempt to save the baby, even with treat-
ment that may be very painful. This provision ... gives a phy-
sician the leeway needed to make such a judgment call without 
159. 130 CONGo REC. H384 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn): 
There is no requirement in this legislation, and we have made it very clear, 
not only in the legislation but in the supporting reports and our colloquy 
here on the fioor, there is no intention to require futile treatment to pro-
long when there is no chance for a successful recovery of the child. 
Id.; 130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nickles): 
[T]he amendment to S1OO3 provides a carefully crafted definition of the 
phrase "withholding of medically indicated treatment" to guide states in 
carrying out the provisions of this act .... 
First, it does not require unending treatment of an infant which is doomed 
to die regardless of what is done. . . . Second, if a child is born with more 
than one anomaly, and one or several are correctable with treatment, but 
the child has some condition which is fatal and untreatable, then the phy-
sician is not being mandated to take the infant through repeated surgeries 
for the correctable condition(s). Third, the language does not apply to 
children in comas. 
Finally, the last exception allows for the so-called gray areas. These are 
the cases when the child has a very slim chance for survival and the physi-
cian must make a judgment call as to whether the odds of correcting the 
child's condition are strong enough to save the baby, even with treatment 
that may be very painful. 
160. 130 CONGo REC. S9323 (daily ed. July 26,1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("We 
must never allow a mind-set that arbitrarily determines the 'quality of life' another 
mayor may not have."); 130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement 
of Sen. Nickles) ("Our Nation has come too far in the mainstreaming of persons 
with disabilities into all aspects of society to sanction a quality of life ethic in which 
only those who are fit or productive or functioning members of society are allowed 
to live."); 130 CONGo REC. S9327 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Jep-
sen) ("We cannot destroy life just because the life does not meet our specifications 
nor can we judge the quality of life. "). 
161. 130 CONGo REC. S9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nickles). 
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fear of violating the letter or spirit of this legislation. 162 
The Nickles formulation leads to the conclusion that in situations when 
the infant might not be dying, Congress was unwilling to require exten-
sive and perhaps painful treatment unless the physician believed there 
was a substantial possibility of improving or correcting the child's condi-
tion through treatment. 
A statement of principles issued by a coalition of medical associa-
tions and advocacy groups for the disabled, which was the basis for the 
congressional consensus on the meaning of medically indicated treat-
ment, supports Senator Nickles' formulation. 163 This document states the 
coalition's view that Congress should err, if at all, on the side of 
treatment: 
In cases where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be 
beneficial, a person's disability must not be the basis for a deci-
sion to withhold treatment. At all times during the process 
when decisions are being made about the benefit or futility of 
medical treatment, the person should be cared for in the medi-
cally most appropriate ways. When doubt exists at any time 
about whether to treat, a presumption always should be in 
favor of treatment. 164 
The coalition took the position that doctors have the leeway neces-
sary to determine whether the treatment will be futile or virtually futile 
when the underlying disability, distinct from the condition to be treated, 
162. Id. 
163. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160-61 (1984); see also 73 PEDIATRICS 559 (April, 1984). 
164. The full statement, entitled Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants, specifies 
when medical treatment should be provided: 
When medical care is clearly beneficial, it should always be provided. 
When appropriate medical care is not available, arrangements should be 
made to transfer the infant to an appropriate medical facility. Considera-
tions such as anticipated or actual limited potential of an individual and 
present or future lack of available community resources are irrelevant and 
must not determine the decisions concerning medical care. The individ-
ual's medical condition should be the sole focus of the decision. These are 
very strict standards. 
It is ethically and legally justified to withhold medical or surgical proce-
dures which are clearly futile and wiIl only prolong the act of dying. How-
ever, supportive care should be provided, including sustenance as 
medically indicated and relief of pain and suffering. The needs of the dy-
ing person should be respected. The family also should be supported in its 
grieving. 
In cases where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be beneficial, 
a person's disability must not be the basis for a decision to withhold treat-
ment. At all times during the process when decisions are being made 
about the benefit or futility of medical treatment, the person should be 
cared for in the medically most appropriate ways. When doubt exists at 
any time about whether to treat, a presumption always should be in favor 
of treatment. 
49 Fed. Reg. 48,160-61 (1984). 
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will not be the basis for a decision to withhold treatment. 165 For exam-
ple, surgery to repair a blocked esophogus cannot be refused because the 
child has Down's syndrome. In addition, when the disability and the 
condition to be treated are indistinguishable, such as surgery to close the 
back of a spina bifida infant, the decision must be made on the basis of 
whether the surgeon believes the operation will be beneficial to the infant 
or will be futile, rather than on the basis of the quality of life of spina 
bifida children generally or of that infant in particular. '66 In other 
words, the condition to be treated, and not the predicted consequences or 
effects of the underlying disability, must be the basis for the treatment 
decision. 
The interpretive guidelines accompanying the HHS rule implement-
ing this Act also shed light on Congressional intent that treatment not be 
required if it "would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the 
infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhu-
mane." 167 The guidelines state that virtually futile treatment is treat-
ment that "is highly unlikely to prevent death in the near future."168 
Treatment is inhumane if "the treatment itself involves significant medi-
cal contraindications and/or significant pain and suffering for the infant 
that clearly outweigh the very slight potential benefit of the treatment for 
an infant highly unlikely to survive."169 The guidelines note that the 
statutory definition for these terms 
recognizes that in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment, 
there are situations where, although there is some slight chance 
that the treatment will be beneficial to the patient (the potential 
treatment is considered virtually futile, rather than futile), the 
potential benefit is so outweighed by negative factors relating to 
the process of the treatment itself that, under the circum-
stances, it would be inhumane to subject the patient to the 
treatment. 170 
C. Infant Care Review Committees 
The enactment recommends the establishment of ICRCs within 
each health care facilityP' Such ICRCs originally were proposed by 
165. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
166. See also HHS Interpretive Guidelines on the Child Abuse Amendments, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 14,892 (1985) (to be codified as an Appendix to 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340) ("A 
number of commenters argued that the [Department's] interpretation should per-
mit, as part of the evaluation whether treatment would be inhumane, consideration 
of the infant's future 'quality of life.' The Department strongly believes such an inter-
pretation would be inconsistent with the statute."). 
167. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text. 
168. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,892 (1985) (to be codified as an Appendix to 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). 
169. [d. 
170. [d. 
171. The enactment contains a provision calling for interim model guidelines to en-
courage the creation of ICRCs: 
Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secre-
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medical groups and opponents of the 1984 amendments as a substitute 
for state and local involvement in the treatment decision-making pro-
cess. 172 The HHS Model Guidelines for the ICRCs,173 published in con-
junction with the final rule and closely paralleling the earlier HHS 
Guidelines for ICRCs under section 504, clearly envision that these hos-
pital review committees would work in coordination with, rather than 
replace, the state child protection services agencies. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Substantive due process: the right to privacy versus the right to life 
Due process of law is guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. 174 The fifth amendment due 
process clause175 protects persons from Federal action that violates cer-
tain individual rights, whereas the fourteenth amendment clause176 pre-
vents similar encroachments by state governments. \77 At a threshold 
tary shall publish interim model guidelines to encourage the establishment 
within health-care facilities of committees which would serve the purposes 
of educating hospital personnel and families of disabled infants with life-
threatening conditions, recommending institutional policies and guidelines 
concerning the withholding of medically indicated treatment . . . from 
such infants, and offering counsel and review in cases involving disabled 
infants with life-threatening conditions. 
42 U.S.c. § 5103 (1984); see also Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to 
Establish Infant Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893-14,901 (1985) 
(model guidelines as required by 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (1984). 
172. A House floor amendment to accomplish this purpose was offered by Representa-
tives Chandler and Waxman. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 182 to 231. 
See 130 CONGo REC. H392-401 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984). 
173. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985). 
174. Equal protection issues may arise in Infant Doe cases where the class of handi-
capped infants is treated different from a similarly situated class of nonhandicapped 
infants. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (infant treated different from fetus); 
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. 
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (infant treated different from adult); Superinten-
dent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (infant 
treated different from mentally retarded elderly person). Equal protection consider-
ations, however, have not yet arisen in the reported Infant Doe cases and therefore 
are beyond the scope of this article. 
175. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... " U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
176. "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .... " U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
177. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-59 (1973) (stating that the Due Process Clause 
of the fourteenth amendment protects a woman's qualified right to terminate her 
pregnancy from state action). The threshold constitutional issue in Infant Doe cases 
is whether state action is present when a severely handicapped infant under care in a 
private hospital is taken off all life support systems. Arguably, a court could find 
state action based on the acceptance of government funding by a hospital. Cf Gil-
more v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (holding that the city of Mont-
gomery had subsidized a racially discriminatory practice by granting exclusive use 
of public facilities to racially segregated groups); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 
455 (1973) (invalidating book subsidy to students attending racially discriminating 
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level, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 
guarantee each person due process when governmental action impairs 
that person's life, liberty, or property. 178 In addition, the Supreme Court 
has held that due process scrutiny is required where there are allegations 
by citizens that the government has violated certain of their fundamental 
rights. 179 The earliest fundamental rights cases involved state infringe-
ment on certain personal and intra-family matters. 180 More recently, the 
Court has recognized a fundamental right of privacy, which is particu-
larly strong in cases involving marriage, conception, pregnancy, and 
child bearing. 181 In cases where the issue is whether governmental action 
violates a fundamental right, the government must show a compelling 
interest that justifies its action. 182 
schools). But cf Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that adjustment 
by state to patients' Medicaid benefits following discharge or transfer from nursing 
home did not constitute state action). A court also may find state action where a 
hospital uses judicial process to order a particular type of medical treatment or 
prohibit a particular medical treatment decision. Cf Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948) (holding unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth amendment a court 
order upholding a racially discriminatory covenant that barred sales of properties to 
racial minorities). For example, such a situation may arise where a hospital secures 
a court order permitting the transfusion of blood into a Jehovah's Witness. 
178. See supra notes 139, 140. 
179. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (interstate travel); Bates v. City of Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (association). 
180. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation is a fundamental right); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (finding a fundamental right of 
parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any 
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish 
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law 
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men .... "). 
181. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) ("[T]he teaching of Gris-
wold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing 
from unjustified intrusion by the State."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) 
("The right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual 
... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (requirement that divorce action be brought in 
court with no right to a waiver of costs violated due process right of those who were 
unable to pay court costs); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating laws 
prohibiting interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) 
(invalidating a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives; "specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance. . .. Various guarantees create zones of 
privacy."). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (banning prosecution 
for possessing obscene materials in the home). 
182. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)) ("[W]here fundamental personal liberties are involved, 
they may not be abridged ... simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has 
some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. 'Where 
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Infant Doe cases present a due process dilemma between the par-
ents' assertion of a privacy interest when making medical treatment deci-
sions for the infant coupled with the parents' assertion of their own 
privacy interest in intra-family decisions and the state's interest in pro-
tecting the infant's life. Encroachment on the infant's or the parents' 
privacy interests by the state may require the state to demonstrate a com-
pelling government interest. 183 Although the Supreme Court has held 
that a state has a compelling interest in protecting the lives of all its 
citizens, some courts have found the state's interest to be less than com-
pelling where handicapped infants are involved. 184 
It has long been recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in 
the lives of infants. The state's interest is rooted in the common law 
doctrine of parens patriae, 185 in state statutes,186 and in the United States 
Constitution. 187 States have been permitted to intervene in medical treat-
ment decisions to protect the interests of individuals,188 particularly 
when the individuals are children. 189 
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only 
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.' "). See also J. NOWAK, 
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457-61 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NOWAK]' 
183. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162 ("separate and distinct" compelling state interests 
"in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . . and . . . in 
protecting the potentiality for human life"). 
184. See infra notes 215-37 and accompanying text. 
185. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("Acting to guard the 
general interest in youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the 
parent's control . . . . Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent 
grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or con-
science."); In re Welcher, 243 N. W.2d 841 (Iowa) (1976) (the state, as parens pa-
triae, has the duty to see that every child within its borders receives proper care and 
treatment). 
186. See discussion of various state civil and criminal statutes in Baumgardner, Defective 
Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principles Emphasized by the Infant 
Doe Case, 14 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 569 (1983). 
187. See supra notes 175, 176. 
188. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown 
College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (blood transfusions ordered for mother of minor 
child over mother's religious objections); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 
576,279 A.2d 670 (1971) (the state has a compelling interest in the life of an uncon-
scious 22-year-old woman who requires transfusions despite her mother's religious 
objections); In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1974) (extensive 
surgery authorized for severely retarded 22-year-old, where surgery might enable 
him to live a more normal life outside of an institution). 
189. See, e.g., In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (14-year-old with epileptic 
seizures whose parents refused treatment on religious grounds was adjudged "de-
pendent and neglected," despite statute prohibiting a finding of neglect if the child is 
"under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer"); People ex rei. Wallace 
v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (doctrine 
of parens patriae required state to order transfusion for minor child over parents' 
religious objections); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) 
(court ordered treatment for two year old child with leukemia over parents' objec-
tions, finding that the state's interest in protecting the life of the child always out-
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Some state courts have addressed the conflict between the interests 
of handicapped children, their parents, and the state, and have found the 
state's assertion of the child's right to life to be paramount. In the case of 
In re Cicero, 190 an infant was born with Meningomyelocele, a spinal birth 
defect. Failure to surgically repair the defect within forty-eight hours 
was likely to result in further complications and death. 191 Initially, the 
infant's father consented to surgery; however, the father subsequently 
withdrew his approval - apparently when the infant's physicians ex-
plained the potential extent of the disorder. 192 Because both parents re-
fused to permit medical treatment, the hospital's chief executive officer 
petitioned the court to be appointed guardian of the infant for the sole 
purpose of consenting to surgery. 193 The New York Supreme Court held 
that the doctrine of parens patriae and the state child neglect statute pro-
vided sufficient basis for ordering surgery on the infant. 194 The court rea-
soned that where the medical prognosis for an infant is that of a useful 
life, courts will not permit parental inaction to impair the prognosis. 195 
The court rejected the argument that the parental right to make decisions 
concerning the treatment, upbringing, and welfare of the infant exceeded 
the state's interest in the infant's life. 196 The court specifically noted, 
however, that the infant's handicapping condition was not severe enough 
to condemn the infant to "an existence which cannot be a life."197 
Other state courts, however, have found the privacy right para-
mount to the state's interest when the infant's prospects for recovery are 
minimal, finding that the state's interest in protecting life falls below the 
threshold of compelling when the infant is terminally ill or irreversibly 
comatose. Thus, according to these courts, the state's interest in protect-
ing the lives of critically ill infant patients varies with the prognosis of 
each infant. 
weighs the parental interests); In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981) 
(court ordered treatment for child with hydrocephalus who faced potentially severe 
brain damage over parents' religious objections); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (cancer treatment ordered for 12-year-old over father's reli-
gious objections where treatment would increase possibility of survival); Mitchell v. 
Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (the state's interest in the welfare of 
its citizens permitted it to take custody of a sick child whose mother rejected ortho-
dox medical treatment in favor of home remedies and prayer). See also Brown & 
Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 615, 632 (1976) 
(citing an unpublished Detroit case where surgery was ordered to correct an intesti-
nal blockage of a Down's syndrome infant). 
190. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 700,421 N.Y.S.2d at 967. 
193. Id. at 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 966. 
194. Id. at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967. 
195. Id. at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967. 
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1. The Substituted Judgment Doctrine: The Quinlan line of cases 
The seminal decision employing the majority approach was In re 
Quinlan. 198 The Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted the removal of 
all life-support systems from twenty-two year old Karen Ann Quinlan. 
Although Quinlan was in a coma, she did retain limited neurological 
functions. 199 The Quinlan court reasoned that an individual's privacy 
right does not terminate because the individual is unconscious and there-
fore unable to exercise it. 200 The court then applied the doctrine of sub-
stituted judgment by further reasoning that Quinlan'S father could 
exercise her right of privacy by using his best judgment to select the 
course of medical treatment that his daughter would have chosen had she 
been competent to make decisions. 201 The court declared that the state 
has no compelling interest in requiring a person in Quinlan'S condition 
"to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility of re-
turning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life."202 
The Quinlan court balanced the individual's privacy interest against 
the state's interest in protecting life and utilized the prognosis for the 
patient and the nature of the required medical treatment as dispositive 
factors. The court reasoned that the state's interest decreases and the 
individual's right to privacy increases as the degree of bodily invasion 
necessary to effect the required medical treatment increases and the pa-
tient's prognosis diminishes. Ultimately, there is a point at which the 
individual's rights overcome the state's interest.203 The Quinlan court 
also approved formation of hospital ethics committees, composed of phy-
sicians, social workers, attorneys, and theologians,204 which function 
much like the HHS Infant Care Review Committee,205 recommending 
and approving treatment decisions. 
The Quinlan analysis has been followed widely in recent years.206 
198. 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger V. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 
(1976). 
199. [d. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. 
200. [d. ("If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non cognitive, vegetative exist-
ence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right of 
privacy ... then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition 
prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.") 
201. [d. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664. The court did not allow Mr. Quinlan to assert his own 
privacy right to determine the care of his 22-year-old daughter, but noted in dicta 
that such a parental right would exist if the child were an infant. [d. 
202. [d. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. 
203. [d. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The court distinguished the case before it from cases 
where blood transfusions had been ordered by noting that a transfusion is a "mini-
mal bodily invasion" and that in such cases the chances of recovery are generally 
good. /d. 
204. /d. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668. 
205. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
206. Cases citing Quinlan and finding the patient's right of privacy paramount include: 
Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985) (com-
petent, terminally-ill 71-year-old may refuse life support); Foody v. Manchester Me-
morial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127,482 A.2d 713 (1984) (42-year-old's prognosis 
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In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,207 a sixty-seven year old 
mentally retarded man with an intelligence quotient of ten and a mental 
age of three was diagnosed as having leukemia.208 The patient's physi-
cian recommended that the man undergo chemotherapy.209 The pa-
tient's guardian objected to chemotherpy treatment because of its adverse 
was so poor that the state had no interest in preventing termination of treatment); 
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (husband of 
comatose woman may invoke her constitutional privacy right and petition court for 
order authorizing removal of life support); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 370 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (mentally alert, but termi-
nally-ill adult has constitutional privacy right permitting him to refuse all treat-
ment); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 
(1977) (guardian of incompetent, terminally-ill cancer patient can refuse chemother-
apy, where evidence showed that patient, if competent, would have elected not to 
take chemotherapy); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) 
(when elderly patient was in a vegetative state, and terminally and irreversibly ill, a 
course of medical treatment excluding attempts at resuscitation in event of cardiac 
arrest was proper); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (state has no com-
pelling interest in life of comatose adult; life support may be removed); In re Quack-
enbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (privacy right of 72-year-old with 
gangrenous legs who refused amputation superceded state's interest in preservation 
of life due to the extensive bodily invasion involved in surgery); Suenram v. Society 
of Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977) (right of terminally-ill, 
elderly cancer patient to reject coventional treatment in favor of laetrile is of the 
most fundamental nature and state's interest was not compelling); In re Storar, 52 
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) 
(authorizing guardian of 83-year-old comatose and terminally-ill cancer patient to 
discontinue respirator where the patient had consistently expressed the desire not to 
have his life prolonged by medical means); In re Jones, 107 Misc.2d 290, 433 
N. Y.S.2d 984 (1980) (permissible for sister of patient to terminate life support when 
patient is brain dead); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 
N.E.2d 809 (1980) (using clear and convincing evidentiary standard, court allowed 
guardian to remove life support for terminally-ill patient who, if competent, would 
have elected removal); In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984) 
(state's interest in preserving life would not require surgery, as opposed to radiation 
treatment, for 66-year-old cancer patient); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 
738 (1983) (husband of woman in chronic vegetative state allowed to terminate life 
support). 
Cases citing Quinlan which did not permit termination of medical treatment 
include: In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (court refused request for removal of 
nose tube from elderly patient since the bodily invasion from the tube was slight, 
and the resultant death by starvation and dehydration would be painful); In re 
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (ordering continua-
tion of blood transfusions for terminally-ill, profoundly retarded adult cancer pa-
tient, where transfusions did not cause excessive pain and allowed patient to 
function at his usual level of mental and physical activity); State ex rei. White v. 
Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) (state's interest in life superceded hunger strik-
ing prisoner's privacy interest). See also In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 
A.2d 360 (1977) (where patient is mentally incapable of consenting to amputation of 
gangrenous foot, guardian may give such consent). 
207. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). The case was argued on July 2, 1976. 
Saikewicz died on September 4, 1976, and the case was decided on November 28, 
1977. 
208. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420. 
209. Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 419. 
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side effects and ineffectiveness in curing leukemia patients. 210 The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied the doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment to permit a court appointed guardian ad litem to exercise 
the incompetent patient's privacy right to refuse chemotherapy treat-
ment.2 11 The court elaborated on the nature of the state interest that 
opposed the individual's privacy right to refuse treatment, finding four 
issues in which the state had a legitimate concern: (1) the preservation of 
life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the 
prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession.212 The Saikewicz court, however, rejected the 
concept of using hospital ethics committees to approve decisions to with-
hold medical treatment.213 Saikewicz merely requires judicial approval 
prior to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from 
an incompetent, in order to avoid civil and criminalliability.214 
Recently, three states have followed Quinlan in situations involving 
severely handicapped children. In In re P. V. W.,215 the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana upheld a state statute providing parents and physicians with 
the right to discontinue life-support systems and other medical treatment 
when a child is in a profound comatose condition and there is no reason-
able medical possibility of recovery.216 The court determined "that a 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431. ("In short, the decision in cases such as this should 
be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were compe-
tent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual 
as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process 
of the competent person.") 
212. 373 Mass. at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
213. Id. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. ("We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the 
ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly established courts of 
proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent.") 
214. In a subsequent case, In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980), the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts clarified that judicial intervention was not 
necessary when "brain death" had occurred, and that in each individual case "a 
variety of circumstances" should be considered before deciding whether judicial in-
tervention is necessary. 
Among [the circumstances] are at least the following: the extent of impair-
ment of the patient's mental faculties, whether the patient is in the custody 
of a State institution, the prognosis without the proposed treatment, the 
prognosis with the proposed treatment, the complexity, risk, and novelty 
of the proposed treatment, its possible side effects, the patient's level of 
understanding and probable reaction, the urgency of decision, the consent 
of the patient, spouse, or guardian, the good faith of those who participate 
in the decision, the clarity of professional opinion as to what is good medi-
cal practice, the interests of third persons, and the administrative require-
ments of any institution involved. We are not called upon [in this case] to 
decide what combination of circumstances makes prior court approval 
necessary or desirable .... 
Id. at 637, 405 N.E.2d at 121. 
215. 424 So. 2d 10 15 (La. 1982). 
216. Id. at 1020. The statute prohibited the denial or deprivation of food, water, and 
oxygen in all cases, and stated that the child's predicted quality of life could not be 
considered in deciding upon the course of medical treatment. See id. at 1019. 
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permanently comatose child has an independent right to discontinuance 
of artificially sustained life through the mechanical invasion of the child's 
body"217 and that this right may be asserted on the child's behalf by an 
appropriate representative.218 
In In re Guardianship of Barry,219 an infant was born severely hand-
icapped with a life expectancy of approximately two years.220 The infant 
lacked ninety percent of his brain function, but was not legally brain 
dead.221 As a result of this permanent and medically irreversible condi-
tion, the infant's parents acting as legal guardians requested the trial 
court to approve the discontinuance and removal of a ventilator life-sup-
port system.222 The infant's three attending physicians and a guardian 
ad litem appointed by the trial court concurred with the parents' deci-
sion.223 The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
order authorizing the discontinuance and removal of the ventilator. The 
court allowed the parents to assert the infant's privacy right and utilized 
the substituted judgment rationale from Quinlan to find that the infant, if 
competent, would exercise his judgment to terminate the life-support sys-
tem.224 The court noted that although the substituted judgment doctrine 
is difficult to apply to infants who have never expressed opinions and 
wishes that could guide the parents' decisions, the court would abide by 
parental decisions supported by competent medical evidence.225 Finally, 
the court refused to require judicial review prior to the termination of 
life-support systems, reasoning that these decisions traditionally were 
made in private by the family based upon medical and religious advice.226 
In In re L.H.R. ,227 an infant, who had a normal birth, suffered a 
tragic "medical catastrophe" fifteen days after birth.228 Eighty-five to 
ninety percent of the infant's brain tissue was destroyed, leaving the in-
fant in a chronic vegetative state with no cognitive functions. 229 The in-
fant's parents, physician, guardian ad litem, and an ICRC convened by 
the hospital agreed that the infant should be removed from life-support 
equipment.23o The hospital sought declaratory relief before granting the 
parents' and guardian ad litem's request to disconnect the life-support 
systems.231 Removal of life-support systems was authorized by the trial 
217. Id. at 1020. 
218.Id. 
219. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
220. Id. at 368. 
221. !d. 
222. Id. at 367. 
223. Id. at 367-68. 
224. !d. at 372. 
225. Id. at 371. 
226.Id. 
227. In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984). 
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court, and the infant died within thirty minutes after removal. 232 
Although the infant died, the ~upreme Court of Georgia granted 
review on the ground that the situation was among those cases capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.233 The Supreme Court of Georgia held 
that parents may assert an infant's privacy rights on his behalf.234 The 
court reasoned that although "the state has an interest in the prolonga-
tion of life, the state has no interest in the prolongation of dying."235 In 
re L.HR. did not involve a compelling state interest, because the court 
found that the state did not have a compelling interest in protecting life 
following a diagnosis by the treating physician and two disinterested phy-
sicians that the infant was terminally ill with no reasonable possibility of 
regaining cognitive function.236 In concluding that judicial review in 
such cases was not necessary,237 the court reached a result clearly com-
patible with that reached in Quinlan. 
Although state courts differ to some extent regarding the need for 
ICRCs and for resort to judicial process,238 the Quinlan line of cases 
demonstrates a substantial consensus on a number of legal issues. First, 
these courts have held that parents can assert their infant's privacy right 
through the doctrine of substituted judgment.239 Second, the infant's pri-
vacy right is of utmost importance and can only be breached in cases 
where the state can show a compelling state interest.240 Third, a state's 
interest in the lives of its citizens lessens as death becomes imminent.241 
Use of the substituted judgment doctrine in Infant Doe cases repre-
sents a novel expansion of the context in which the doctrine traditionally 
was applied. The substituted judgment doctrine evolved as courts at-
tempted to ascertain the wishes of unconscious or incompetent adult pa-
tients regarding their future courses of medical treatment. The doctrine 
requires a court to "don the mental mantle of the incompetent"242 and to 
examine the opinions, beliefs, and statements of each patient to deter-
mine what course of treatment that patient would choose. According to 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: "[A court should] ascertain 
the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences." 243 
232.Id. 
233.Id. 
234. Id. at 446, 321 S.E.2d 722-23 (1984). 
235. Id. 
236. /d. 
237. Id. The court also noted that although consultation with an ICRC was encouraged, 
it was not necessary in such cases. 
238. Compare Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976) (discussing favorably the 
concept of an ICRC as a tool for diffusing decision-making responsibility) with 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (1977) (stating that the judiciary, 
not an ICRC, should have ultimate decision-making authority). 
239. See supra notes 198-237 and accompanying text. 
240. /d. 
241. /d. 
242. In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 839-40, 689 P.2d 1363, 1369-70 (1984)(citing In re 
Carson, 39 Misc.2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (1962». 
243. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431. 
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Application of the substituted judgment doctrine in Infant Doe situ-
ations is plagued by an inherent uncertainty: the absence of a mental 
mantle for the court to don. An infant has not expressed any interests or 
preferences concerning medical treatment. In Infant Doe situations, the 
substituted judgment doctrine is not resolved as a question of fact; in-
stead, resolution is essentially a matter of judicial fiat. 
Use of the substituted judgment doctrine also is troubling in Infant 
Doe situations in which there is no general consensus within the medical 
community as to the medical prognosis of the affliction. In some situa-
tions, such as those involving severe microcephaly,244 where the handi-
cap is so severe that the medical prognosis is that the infant will never 
have basic cognitive development, courts might enjoy a certain degree of 
confidence in applying the substituted judgment doctrine at the parents' 
request. Other circumstances, however, particularly those involving con-
ditions such as Down's syndrome and spina bifida where the severity of 
the mental and physical handicaps are not apparent during infancy, are 
considerably more problematic, and the appropriateness of using the sub-
stituted judgment doctrine in these situations must be questioned. 
Although the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 do not employ the 
Quinlan balancing approach whereby the state's interest lessens as the 
prognosis worsens, the Act should withstand constitutional scrutiny by a 
court applying the Quinlan analysis. The Act expressly states that medi-
cally indicated treatment is not required when the infant is irreversibly 
comatose or has no reasonable chance for survival.245 The Amendments 
do not require medical treatment in situations substantially equivalent to 
those situations where state courts have found that an individual's pri-
vacy right supercedes the state's interest. Likewise, the HHS rule under 
section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not require 
futile treatment or treatment that prolongs dying.246 Hence, the HHS 
rule also passes constitutional muster under a Quinlan analysis. 
2. A comparison: Federal blood transfusion cases 
Federal cases concerning blood transfusions that are objected to on 
religious grounds provide an instructive analogy to Infant Doe cases. An 
important decision in this area is In re President & Directors of Ge-
orgetown College. 247 In Georgetown College, a mother of a seven-month 
old child was brought to the hospital by her husband for emergency 
care.248 The woman had lost a great deal of blood due to a ruptured 
ulcer.249 The doctors assigned to the patient agreed that she would die 
without blood transfusions; however, she had better than a fifty percent 
244. See supra note 58. 
245. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. 
246. See text accompanying supra notes 47-51. 
247. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). 
248. Id. at 1006. 
249. Id. 
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chance for survival if she received blood.2sO 
Based on their religious beliefs, the patient and her husband refused 
to consent to blood transfusions.2s1 Both the patient and her husband 
were Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect whose doctrine opposes the 
transfusion ofblood. 2s2 The United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia denied the hospital's application for permission to adminis-
ter blood transfusions to an emergency patient. 2s3 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court and permitted attending physicians to administer blood trans-
fusions to the patient whenever necessary to save her life.2s4 
The court found the law well-settled that courts may order compul-
sory medical treatment for seriously ill or injured children and also for 
adults with contagious conditions.2s5 The court held that judicial au-
thority to order treatment was not subject to religious exceptions.256 
Moreover, the court read Prince v. Massachusetts as standing for the 
principle that, despite protestations advanced on religious grounds, the 
state may intervene in the family relationship to protect the child: "Act-
ing to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens 
patriae may restrict the parents' control. ... Its authority is not nullified 
merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course 
of conduct on religion or conscience."257 The court analogized the pa-
tient's temporary lack of mental competence to make decisions regarding 
her treatment to that of a child and thus found that it could intervene in 
the treatment decision of the patient.258 Finally, the court found that the 
existence of the dependent child, for whom the patient had a responsibil-
ity to the community to care for, permitted the state, as parens patriae, to 
intervene in the treatment decision in order to save the patient's life.259 
Since Georgetown College was decided, the majority of blood trans-
fusion cases involving children260 and parents of dependent children261 
250. Id. at 1007. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 1006. 
253. Id. at 1004. 
254. Id. at 1002. 
255. Id. at 1007-08. 
256. Id. at 1008 (citing People ex rei. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 
(right of freedom of religion is not beyond limitation), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 
(1952». 
257. /d. at 1008 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944». 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Harley v. Oliver, 404 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King 
County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 u.S. 598 (1968) (per 
curiam) ; State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 
(1962); Muhlenberg Hasp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974); 
Crouse Irving Memorial Hasp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc.2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 
(1985) (transfusions for mother and infant during delivery). 
261. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hasp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, 
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (pregnant woman); In re Jamaica Hasp., 128 
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have permitted or ordered transfusions. On the other hand, courts gen-
erally have not required blood transfusions where a competent adult pa-
tient without dependent children objects to the procedure.262 Three 
blood transfusion cases involving children are particularly significant to 
the current debate surrounding the rights of handicapped infants. 
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital 263 is unusual among 
blood transfusion cases. The Jehovah's Witnesses, the Watch Tower Bi-
ble and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, and individually named Jehovah's 
Witnesses brought a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on their behalf 
and as a class action on behalf of all Jehovah's Witnesses in the State of 
Washington against superior court judges, juvenile court employees, state 
hospitals and their employees, and physicians.264 The plaintiffs sought a 
legal declaration of their rights and a permanent injunction preventing 
the defendants from administering blood transfusions to the plaintiffs in 
the future against their wishes or, in the case of infants, against their 
parents' wishes.265 Each principal plaintiff asserted a right to family pri-
vacy under the ninth and fourteenth amendments.266 In addition, indi-
vidually named minor plaintiffs and their parents asserted a right to free 
exercise of religion under the first amendment. 267 
The three-judge federal district court denied the plaintiffs' argu-
ments on the basis of Prince v. Massachusetts. 268 In rejecting the free 
exercise of religion and family privacy arguments, the court stated that 
neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limita-
tion.269 The Supreme Court upheld the three-judge panel in a per curiam 
decision without opinion, which cited only Prince v. Massachusetts.27o 
Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital v. Paddock 271 involved a mother 
with an intrauterine pregnancy and other complications who was carry-
ing an infant with hydrocephalus. The New York court held the hospi-
tal could give blood transfusions to mother and infant during and 
immediately following delivery.272 In light of the authority given to all 
Misc.2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) (woman was 18 weeks pregnant); In re 
Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc.2d 804, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1985). 
262. In re Osbourne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 
N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 70S (1962). 
But cf United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965). 
263. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per 
curiam). 
264. Id. at 491. 
265. Id. at 501. 
266.Id. 
267. Id. at 491. In all reported Infant Doe cases to date, it is the infant's right to privacy 
which predominates rather than that of the parents. 
268. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
269. Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. 488,504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam), aff'd, 
390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944». 
270. 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam). 
271. 127 Misc. 2d 101,485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985). 
272. Id. at 104, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 446. 
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physicians to carry out their duties and maintain life, the court deemed 
the allowance of transfusions both proper and necessary.273 The court 
specifically stated that "[e]ven when the parents' decision to decline nec-
essary treatment is based on constitutional grounds ... it must yield to 
the state's interest, as parens patriae, in protecting the health and welfare 
of the child."274 By finding that, despite the infant's handicap, the state 
had an overriding interest in protecting the infant's welfare,275 the court 
affirmed the extent of the state's interest in every child and implicitly 
rejected the Quinlan analysis that the state has a lesser interest in certain 
handicapped citizens.276 
In Muhlenberg Hospital v. Pauerson,277 a premature infant whose 
parents were Jehovah's Witnesses required blood transfusions to prevent 
severe and irreparable brain damage.278 The court ordered blood trans-
fusions even though the infant's life was not in immediate danger279 and 
the probable result of not so ordering was serious injury rather than 
death.280 The court stated that it "will continue to be the guardian of the 
religious rights of the individuals to see that [the] power of the State is 
not exercised beyond the area where treatment is necessary for the sus-
taining of life or the prevention of grievous bodily injury."281 In Muhlen-
berg Hospital, the state's interest in protecting the child overrode the 
parent's fundamental right to refuse transfusions, even though the state's 
interest in preventing injury is less than its interest in preventing loss of 
life. 
In the two decades since Jehovah's Witnesses was decided, the trans-
fusion cases involving children generally have not involved claims of a 
privacy right or a free exercise right by the child on his own behalf. In-
stead, the parents' free exercise right has been at issue. The transfusion 
cases differ from the Infant Doe cases, in which the parents' assertion of 
the infant's right is balanced against the state's interest in preserving the 
infant's life. The blood transfusion cases involving children, however, 
are instructive. 
Georgetown College and its progeny are applicable in the Infant Doe 
context for several reasons. First, the patient often is incompetent to 
speak for himself. Second, the state has a strong interest in protecting its 
citizens' lives, particularly when the infant or incompetent person cannot 
make reasoned decisions. Third, and of greatest importance, the asser-
tion of a fundamental right - the right to freely exercise one's religion 
- does not override the state's interest in protecting the life of an 
273. [d. 
274. Id. at 104, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445. 
275. !d. at 102, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445. 
276. Id. 
277. 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974). 
278. !d. at 499, 320 A.2d at 519. 
279. Id. at 500, 320 A.2d at 519. 
280. !d. 
281. [d. at 502, 320 A.2d at 521. 
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infant.282 
Infant Doe cases mirror blood transfusion cases to the extent that 
the interests involved in both types of cases fall within the broad defini-
tion of fundamental rights. The privacy interests presented in Infant Doe 
cases involve parents' assertions of their right to make intra-family deci-
sions and the infant's right to refuse medical treatment. Although the 
Supreme Court requires a compelling state interest to overcome the free 
exercise right to practice religion283 and the privacy right to make intra-
family decisions,284 the Court has not determined the degree of state in-
terest sufficient to overcome an individual's privacy right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. 
3. Substantive due process: a conclusion 
An analysis of the Quinlan line of cases and the blood transfusion 
line of cases in light of the Infant Doe controversy reveals two conflicting 
interests. One is the privacy interest of the infant, which is asserted by 
the parents. The other is the interest in the infant's life, which is asserted 
by the state on behalf of the infant. 
Although parents have a separate privacy interest in family deci-
sions, this interest will not prevent the state from inquiring into their 
decision-making process. The genesis of the parental privacy interest is 
Prince v. Massachusetts,285 a case in which the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged parents' right of custody, care and nurture for their child,286 but 
held that the family relationship was not beyond regulation in the public 
interest.287 The Court reasoned that the state has a general interest in a 
child's well being,288 which gives the state greater authority over chil-
dren's activities than adult's activities.289 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,290 the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the right of the state to intervene in the 
family relationship to promote state interests in the health, safety, and 
general welfare of a child even though that intervention may interfere 
with a fundamental right.291 
In Infant Doe situations, the state's inquiry into the decisional pro-
cess is concerned solely with determining whether the infant's health, 
safety, and welfare is protected. The parental privacy interest should not 
be used as a shield to block state inquiry. The trial judge in University 
Hospital examined the issue of state authority to inquire into the paren-
tal decision-making process in the face of a privacy right objection, and 
282. See NOWAK, supra note 182, at 448, 1053. 
283. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
284. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944). 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 166. 
287.Id. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 168. 
290. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
291. Id. at 220. 
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he correctly noted that the state should be permitted to ascertain whether 
the parent's decision was in the infant's best interest: 
It would be highly paradoxical if an individual's right to pri-
vacy could be asserted by that individual's parent or guardian, 
purportedly acting in that individual's own best interests, for 
the purpose of precluding an inquiry into the question of 
whether the parent or guardian was in fact acting in the indi-
vidual's best interest. 292 
Once the inquiry regarding the treatment decision is made, attention 
shifts to the parent's assertion of the infant's privacy right, and the state's 
interest in the infant. The blood transfusion cases together with Prince v. 
Massachusetts demonstrate that the state has a heightened interest in the 
lives and welfare of infants. Although the exact extent of an infant's 
privacy right has not been established, the privacy right of children is 
narrower than the privacy right of adults. For example, high school stu-
dents are subject to reduced fourth amendment search and seizure pro-
tections.293 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,294 the Supreme Court 
observed that the state has broader authority to regulate the conduct of 
children than it does to regulate the conduct of adults295 and that a sig-
nificant state interest may overcome a minor's privacy claim.296 
In light of the heightened state interest and the reduced privacy in-
terest for children, federal efforts to review medical treatment decisions 
and to take necessary protective measures for handicapped infants are 
constitutional. Courts using the Quinlan analysis, however, would re-
view federal efforts on a case-by-case basis and likely bar the state's in-
volvement in cases where the handicap is extreme on the theory that the 
state's interest no longer supercedes the privacy interest of the child or 
his parents. 
B. Procedural due process 
A second due process issue presented by Infant Doe cases concerns 
the procedures necessary to ensure that any infant's constitutional rights 
are protected. The decision by parents and doctors to remove life-sup-
port systems or to withhold medical treatment from an infant normally 
will result in death. Hence, a tenable argument can be made that the 
infant will be "deprived of life in contravention of the fourteenth amend-
292. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 615-16 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 
729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
293. See New Jersey v. T.L.D., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743-44 (1985) (concluding that need of 
teachers and administrators for "substantial freedom" to keep order in schools justi-
fies searches of students based on criterion of "reasonableness under the circum-
stances" rather than probable cause). See also Minor's Right 0/ Privacy, 8 J. Jvv. L. 
435 (1984). 
294. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
295. /d. at 74. 
296. Id. at 75. 
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ment."297 Equitable procedures therefore are necessary to ascertain 
whether there is a sufficient basis for the decision to withhold or to termi-
nate treatment.298 Also, because some courts have found that parents are 
exercising the infant's fundamental right of privacy when treatment deci-
sions are made, any type of state involvement in the decisional process 
requires a determination that the state has a compelling interest and that 
state involvement is accomplished through fair procedures.299 
1. Federal procedural requirements 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a state may authorize 
the removal of life-support systems or the withholding of medical treat-
ment from handicapped infants or individuals unable to request treat-
ment.300 Although the ambit of protection afforded by procedural due 
process in these cases is unknown, the Supreme Court has created a tri-
partite test to determine the minimal constitutional protections required. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,30l a case dealing with entitlement to benefits 
under the Social Security Act, the Court stated that the procedures uti-
lized to determine the constitutional sufficiency of administrative proce-
dures prior to initial termination of benefits and pending review should 
be based upon a consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest 
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
the interest through the procedures used and the probable value of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's in-
terest, including the governmental function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirements entail.302 The essential elements of procedural due process 
which may be required after consideration of the Mathews factors include 
the following: (1) adequate notice of the basis for the governmental ac-
tion; (2) a neutral decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to make an oral 
presentation to the decision-maker; (4) an opportunity to present evi-
dence or witnesses to the decision-maker; (5) an opportunity to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses or evidence to be used against the individ-
ual; (6) the right to have an attorney present the individual's case to the 
decision-maker; and (7) a decision based on the record with a statement 
of reasons for the decision. 303 
297. See supra notes 175 and 176. 
298. See NOWAK, supra note 182, at 526. 
299. /d. at 539. 
300. But see supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in In re Quinlan following state court approval of a father's 
decision to remove his comatose daughter's life support system, even though the 
court was unable to determine the daughter's wishes. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 
A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
301. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
302. Id. at 335. The Court cited Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), for the prop-
osition that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands." 424 U.S. at 334. 
303. See NOWAK, supra note 182, at 555-56. 
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In Parham v. J.R.,304 the Supreme Court scrutinized the procedures 
required for a parent to commit a minor child to a mental institution. In 
Parham, the Court recognized the inherent conflict between the child's 
substantial liberty interest in not being committed to a mental institution 
and the parents' privacy interest in the health and welfare of the child.305 
The Court rejected the contention that the magnitude of the child's con-
stitutional interest and the possibility of parents abusing their privilege to 
commit troubled children required a formal adversarial hearing.306 In-
stead, the Court found that due process was satisfied where the superin-
tendent of the mental hospital presided over an administrative hearing in 
which the child's parents retained a substantial role in the commitment 
decision.307 The Court stated that "[w]hat process is constitutionally due 
cannot be divorced from the ultimate decision."30s From this premise, 
the Parham Court reasoned that the questions involved in decisions to 
commit were essentially medical, and therefore physicians, rather than 
the judiciary, should make commitment decisions.309 The Court rea-
soned that parents normally act in the best interests of their children and 
that the law presumes parents have the maturity, experience, and capac-
ity necessary to make commitment decisions.310 Furthermore, the Court 
found that an adversarial hearing was unnecessary on the ground, inter 
alia, that when parents attempt to commit a troubled child such hearings 
could exacerbate the tensions already existing in the parent-child 
relationship.311 
Parham requires only a fair examination of the circumstances by a 
neutral decision-maker before a parent can commit a child. There are 
three significant differences, however, between the facts of Parham and 
situations in which handicapped infants are denied life-saving medical 
treatment. These differences may affect the extent of procedural protec-
tions required. First, the magnitude of the child's interest differs. 
Parham involved a temporary deprivation of liberty, whereas Infant Doe 
situations involve a permanent deprivation of life. The substantially 
greater interest presented by Infant Doe cases mandates more significant 
due process protections under the first and second prongs of the Mathews 
test.312 Second, the nature of the state's interest differs. The Parham 
304. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
305. !d. at 600. 
306. Id. at 602. 
307. Id. at 604. The Court did note, however, that "the child's rights and the nature of 
the commitment decision are such that the parents cannot have absolute and unre-
viewable discretion to decide whether to have a child institutionalized." Id. at 604. 
308. Id. at 608. 
309. Id. at 608-09. 
310. Id. at 602. 
311. Id. at 610. 
312. The Parham decision implicitly recognized the temporary nature of the commit-
ment decision and, therefore, the ability to reverse an erroneous decision. Parham, 
442 U.S. at 607 n.15 ("[W]e ... have no reason to consider at this time what 
procedures for review are independently necessary to justify continuing a child's 
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Court did not identify an independent state interest in protecting the 
child's liberty from parental infringement. State courts, however, gener-
ally acknowledge that a state has a compelling interest in the life of a 
child, especially when the child is neither comatose nor terminally ill. 3 \3 
Unlike Parham, a decision to withhold medical treatment in an Infant 
Doe case could permanently destroy the state's compelling interest in the 
life of one of its citizens.314 Third, the potentially negative impact of an 
adversarial hearing on the parent-child relationship, as described in 
Parham, is not present in an Infant Doe setting. Protective measures 
greater than Parham procedures may be required by the Constitution in 
Infant Doe cases. 
2. State court procedures in Infant Doe cases 
At least three states currently require thorough procedures in Infant 
Doe situations to guarantee that the interests of the child, the parent, and 
the state are protected. The Louisiana legislature has enacted a statute 
permitting a handicapped infant's physician the right to discontinue life-
support systems and medical treatment, but not food, water, or oxygen, 
when the child is comatose and has no reasonable chance for recovery. 3 15 
To this statutory framework, the Louisiana Supreme Court has endorsed 
additional procedural protections. These safeguards include the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem, the appointment of an independent physi-
cian to review the diagnosis, joinder of the state attorney general and the 
local district attorney, and use of a clear and convincing evidentiary stan-
dard.316 The Louisiana court, however, has not spelled out when judicial 
action is advisable or required. 
In In re Guardianship of Barry,317 a Florida trial court appointed a 
guardian ad litem to represent a handicapped infant's interests in the 
judicial proceedings. 318 Notwithstanding its action, the court stressed 
that judicial review of parental decisions, traditionally made within the 
privacy of the family relationship, is not required.319 The court sug-
gested, however, that any diagnosis that could result in non treatment be 
confirmed by at least two physicians and that judicial review must be 
available if: (1) doubt exists about whether the child has a permanent, 
confinement. We merely hold that a subsequent, independent review of the patient's 
condition provides a necessary check against possible arbitrariness in the initial ad-
mission decision."). 
313. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
314. For example, applying the Quinlan analysis to the Bloomington Baby Doe case, a 
court could find a compelling state interest that would overcome the infant's privacy 
right, because the infant was neither terminally ill nor comatose. Moreover, the 
surgery needed to prolong the infant's life was routine and likely to be successful. 
315. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.1 C. (West Supp. 1986). See In re P.V.W., 424 
So.2d 1015, 1016 (La. 1984). 
316. 424 So.2d at 1020. 
317. 445 So.2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
318. Id. at 367. 
319. Id. at 371. 
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incurable, and irreversible condition likely to imminently result in death; 
(2) there is a lack of concurrence among the family, physicians, and the 
hospital; or (3) an affected party desires a judicial decree.32o Finally, 
other courts were urged to adopt expedited procedures for Infant Doe 
cases and to apply a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when de-
termining whether "the child suffers from an irreversible physical or 
mental defect, and there is no reasonable medical probability of the in-
fant gaining a cognitive, sapient state."321 
The Georgia Supreme Court in In re L.H.R. 322 closely paralleled the 
Barry court's procedural protections by acceding to the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem at the trial level and by requiring the concurrence of 
two independent physicians in the diagnosis.323 The Georgia court did 
not require that either a court or an ICRC review a parental decision to 
terminate treatment, but did indicate that judicial review would be avail-
able at the parties' request. 324 
3. Recommended procedures to satisfy due process 
In Infant Doe cases, the compelling constitutional interests of life 
and privacy and the potentially irreversible consequences of an erroneous 
decision underscore the need for careful and thorough review procedures 
prior to implementing a decision to terminate life-support systems or 
withhold medical treatment. Although parents must retain principal re-
sponsibility for decisions regarding the well-being of their children, the 
tremendous emotional, mental, and economic pressures following the 
birth of a severely handicapped infant necessitate the appointment of a 
neutral decision-maker to review parental decisions to ensure that they 
are consistent with the child's best interests. The HHS recommendation 
of ICRCs composed of individuals with no personal interest in the case 
can provide this review. ICRCs should include: (1) two or more in-
dependent physicians who can review the diagnosis; (2) a guardian ad 
litem or other advocate for the handicapped infant to represent the in-
fant's interests; and (3) other individuals from outside the medical com-
munity who are independent of the administration and staff of the 
involved health care facility. The state child protective services agency 
or the local juvenile court could appoint the guardian ad litem or advo-
cate. Additionally, expedited judicial review under a clear and convinc-
ing evidentiary standard must be available whenever the treating 
physician or any member of the ICRC disagrees with a final decision to 
terminate life-support systems or withhold treatment. 
320. Id. at 372. 
321. [d. 
322. 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984). 
323. [d. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 722-23. 
324. [d. at 446-47, 321 S.E.2d at 723. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The extraordinary difficulty inherent in Infant Doe cases is that the 
very person whose interests should always control any decision regarding 
treatment is silent. Parents may assert an independent privacy right in 
making family decisions and the state may assert an independent interest 
in protecting the lives of each of its citizens; however, in the final analy-
sis, any judicial determination regarding treatment must be based on the 
interests of the infant. In dealing with Infant Doe cases, courts must 
attempt to resolve complex issues involved in the question of whether 
the infant would choose to live, as asserted by the state, or would choose 
to die, as asserted by the parents. 
Because the infant whose life is at stake cannot speak for himself, an 
administrative review mechanism must be established to monitor medical 
treatment decisions. The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 establish 
such a mechanism through state child protection agencies and provide 
reasonable guidelines regarding implementation of extraordinary treat-
ment measures. The rules promulgated by HHS under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 complemented the Child Abuse Amendments 
of 1984 by permitting the federal government to intervene quickly when 
state procedures are not adequately protecting handicapped infants. 
By striking down the HHS rules on procedural grounds in Bowen v. 
American Hospital Association, the Supreme Court has limited the federal 
protection accorded the constitutional rights of handicapped infants. 
Unless HHS acts on a case-by-case basis, or Congress amends section 
504, then the right of handicapped infants to receive life-sustaining treat-
ment may not be adequately protected. Handicapped persons, regardless 
of age, must possess the same rights as the nonhandicapped. Section 504 
and the Child Abuse Amendments, when used together, provide an effec-
tive, prudent, and measured federal response to discrimination against 
handicapped infants. 
